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SHIFTING OUT OF NEUTRAL: INTELLIGENT DESIGN
AND THE ROAD TO NONPREFERENTIALISM
KELLY S. TERRY*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself in a biology classroom in a public high school in the year
2012. Posters depicting cell structures and anatomical systems adorn the walls.
Rows of microscopes line a shelf above a sink. An American flag stands in one
corner, while a human skeleton hangs in another. Amidst their backpacks and
textbooks, restless teenagers sit at rows of tables facing the teacher at the front
of the room. The teacher opens the class with the following statement:
We are about to begin a study of Darwin's theory of evolution. I am
obligated to inform you that evolution is a theory and not a fact. Gaps
exist in Darwin's theory for which there is no evidence. Once we com-
plete the unit of study on evolution, we will undertake a unit of study on
Intelligent Design, which is an alternative explanation for the origin of life
that differs from Darwin's theory. The basic premise of Intelligent Design
is that the world and its creatures, including humans, are much too com-
plex to be the product of random patterns of evolution and therefore must
be the product of some intelligent designer. The Intelligent Design theory
does not specify the identity of the designer, but it does not rule out a
supernatural creator.
This scenario may seem preposterous to proponents of separation of church
and state, but it is not so far-fetched. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
along with former Chief Justice Rehnquist, have altered the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause' jurisprudence over the last twenty years and significant-
ly weakened the "wall of separation"2 between church and state. The Court's
newest members, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, appear poised to con-
tinue these doctrinal changes and further diminish the boundaries between re-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen
School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Dean John DiPippa and
Professor Theresa Beiner for their insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of
this article. The author also wishes to thank the Southeastern Association of Law Schools
for the opportunity to present this article at a New Scholars Workshop during the
Association's 2008 annual meeting.
I "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST.
amend I.
2 Everson v. Bd. of Edu. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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ligion and government.3
The "wall of separation" metaphor comes from the Supreme Court's first
significant interpretation of the Establishment Clause, Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation of Ewing.4 In Everson, the Court adopted a neutrality principle for de-
termining whether government conduct constitutes an impermissible establish-
ment of religion.5 The neutrality principle provides that government must
maintain a wall of separation between church and state and "be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers." 6  Thus,
"[n]either a state nor the [f]ederal [g]overnment can set up a church" or "pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over anoth-
er."
7
In the sixty years since Everson, however, the Court has struggled to define
what it means for government to be neutral with respect to religion.' The
Court's members have repeatedly debated the definition of neutrality, and they
have proposed widely divergent standards employing varying degrees of
church-state separation. This disagreement produced an Establishment Clause
I Professor Stephen Gey predicts that it is likely that
we now have a Supreme Court comprised of five members who are deeply opposed to
virtually everything the Supreme Court has said about the relationship between church
and state since the Court first started rigorously enforcing the Establishment Clause in
1947. We may be on the cusp of a root-and-branch change in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, which will fundamentally alter the landscape of church/state relations
and produce a constitutional regime that specifically permits the government to endorse
the views of the religious majority and use government programs to advance the majori-
ty's sectarian goals.
Stephen G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006-
07); see also id. at 3 (Roberts and Alito are "hostile to the basic concept of separation of
church and state, and will actively campaign on the Court to eradicate the principle altogeth-
er"); Stephen A. Newman, Evolution and the Holy Ghost of Scopes: Can Science Lose the
Next Round?, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 11, 28 (2007) (Alito and Roberts likely "will be
receptive to a trimming of the Establishment Clause in the direction of allowing a more
ubiquitous religious presence in the public sphere.").
4 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 15. The Establishment Clause has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and therefore applies to the states. Id. at 8.
s See Keith Werhan, Navigating the New Neutrality: School Vouchers, the Pledge, and
the Limits of a Purposive Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 603, 604 (2002-03) ("Ev-
erson's easy statement of the neutrality principle disguised its enduring difficulty, for the
principle has proven far easier to state than to apply in contested cases."); see also Patrick
M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument
for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (calling Everson
"the Court's first formal foray into what would become a jungle of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.").
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jurisprudence that is confusing, inconsistent, and deeply divided.9
The appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, however, stand
to produce a majority that will agree on a new Establishment Clause standard.
In recent cases, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas have rejected the notion
of neutrality and taken positions consistent with nonpreferentialism, ° an Estab-
lishment Clause interpretation that Justice Rehnquist proposed in 1985.11 The
nonpreferentialist doctrine states that government may aid religion and favor
religion over nonreligion, so long as it does not establish a national church or
discriminate among religions.12 In their past writings and opinions, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justice Alito also have expressed views consistent with Rehn-
quist's nonpreferentialist standard.13 Thus, if given the opportunity, they could
tip the balance in favor of a radically different interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause.
The teaching of intelligent design in public schools may well provide that
opportunity. In recent years, critics of evolution have urged state and local
boards of education to mandate the teaching of this theory as an alternative to
evolution.14 The fundamental premise of intelligent design is that "the world
and its creatures are far too complex to have arisen through random patterns of
evolution and must be the product of some intelligent designer."1 5 "Because
intelligent design theory does not necessarily rely on any particular conception
of the designer and does not require belief in any particular biblical story, such
as the six-day creation or great flood, intelligent design theory is put forth as
science, not religion, and thus as a worthy complement to evolution in the
classroom."' 6
In 2005, a federal district court in Pennsylvania became the first in the nation
to assess the constitutionality of teaching intelligent design in public schools.
1 7
9 Stephen G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006) ("It is by now axiomatic that the Supreme Court's Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence is a mess-both hopelessly confused and deeply contradicto-
ry. On a purely doctrinal level, the Court cannot even settle on one standard to apply in all
Establishment Clause cases.").
10 See infra Section I.D.
11 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'3 See infra Section IV.A-B.
'4 See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, Trustees Kill Plan to Buy Divisive Book Plano Biology
Teachers Won't Receive Copies, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 8, 1995, at IA.
15 Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The Constitution-
ality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REV. 439, 442 (1996-
97).
16 Id. (citations omitted).
17 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp.2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005); see also
Martha M. McCarthy, Instruction About the Origin of Humanity: Legal Controversies
Evolve, 203 ED. LAW REP. 453, 464 (West 2006).
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In Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, the court ruled that a school district
policy mandating instruction on this theory violated the Establishment Clause. 8
Both before and after Kitzmiller, scholars debated whether teaching intelligent
design is constitutional under the Supreme Court's existing Establishment
Clause standards.19 This article, however, asserts that an intelligent design case
would allow the Court to reconsider its existing standards and that, with Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito on the Court, there is now a majority that
could adopt nonpreferentialism in lieu of neutrality, thus demolishing the "wall
of separation."
Following this introduction, Section I of this article traces the development
of the neutrality principle, examines the different neutrality standards that the
Court has employed, and explains positions taken by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas that are consistent with Rehnquist's nonpreferentialist standard.
Section II discusses three of the Court's most recent Establishment Clause deci-
sions to provide a current snapshot of the debate over a governing standard.
Section III explains how Justice Kennedy's concerns about coercion of students
could prevent him from agreeing with the adoption of a nonpreferentialist stan-
dard. In Section IV, I examine the prior writings and opinions of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito to demonstrate that they hold views consistent with
nonpreferentialism. Sections V and VI discuss how the intelligent design de-
bate could be the vehicle for a majority of the Court to adopt a nonpreferential-
ist interpretation of the Establishment Clause and explains the ramifications of
such a decision. Section VII concludes the article.
I. THE COMPETING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE STANDARDS
Since Everson, members of the Court have proposed Establishment Clause
standards ranging from absolute separation of church and state, to government
accommodation of religion, to government promotion of religion. Professor
Rodney Smith has aligned these standards along a continuum.2" At one end of
the continuum is strict separation, which "prohibits[s] government from aiding
religion in any form."21 At the opposite end of the continuum is the theocratic
view, which "permit[s] government to establish a national religion[.]"2 Be-
tween strict separation and the theocratic view lie varying degrees of govern-
ment support and accommodation of religion.23
18 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp.2d at 708-09.
19 See, e.g., infra notes 294, 296-297, and 328.
20 Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentialism In Establishment Clause Analysis: A Response
to Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 245, 248-51 (1991).
21 Id. at 248.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 251.
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A. Neutrality
One form of accommodation, which lies close to separation, is neutrality.24
The leading expositor of this principle is Professor Douglas Laycock, who
identifies three types of neutrality that the Court has employed since Everson.25
One type is "formal neutrality", which he defines as a prohibition on religious
classifications.2 6
The second type of neutrality, which Everson exemplifies, is "substantive
neutrality. 27 Under this standard, "the religion clauses require government to
minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious be-
lief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance. '2' By
this, Professor Laycock means that
religion is to be left as wholly to private choice as anything can be. It
should proceed as unaffected by government as possible. Government
should not interfere with our beliefs about religion either by coercion or by
persuasion. Religion may flourish or wither; it may change or stay the
same. What happens to religion is up to the people acting severally and
voluntarily; it is not up to the people acting collectively through govern-
ment.29
24 Smith distinguishes between neutrality and strict separation based on disadvantages
incurred by religion. He posits that neutrality "would permit government to aid or accom-
modate religion when failure to do so would disadvantage religion, while strict separation
would never allow such support." Id.
25 Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Relig-
ion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1989-90). Professor Laycock also rejects the sharp distinction
that some scholars draw between neutrality and separation. See Douglas Laycock, The Un-
derlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L. J. 43, 46 (1997) (asserting that the
Court views separation as a means of "implementing neutrality among faiths and between
faith and disbelief' and "has never said that separation was fundamentally distinct from
neutrality or religious choice.").
26 Laycock, supra note 25, at 999. This definition is based on a principle of formal
neutrality first articulated by Professor Philip Kurland, who asserted that the Religion
Clauses must be read together to "prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer
a benefit or to impose a burden." Id. (quoting Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961)). Professor Laycock cites Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), as a classic example of formal neutrality. Laycock,
supra note 25, at 1000.
27 Laycock, supra note 25, at 1001.
28 Id. See also Paul E. Salamanca, Quo Vadis: The Continuing Metamorphosis of the
Establishment Clause Toward Realistic Substantive Neutrality, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 575, 575
(2002-03) ("Under [substantive neutrality], courts and commentators purport to ask whether
a public policy under scrutiny is likely to affect religious choices in an unacceptable way.").
But cf. Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Princi-
ples, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 492 (2003-04) (arguing
that "neutrality, whether [called] formal or substantive, does not exist.").
29 Laycock, supra note 25, at 1002. This definition reflects Professor Laycock's own
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"Disaggregated neutrality" is the third type of neutrality that Professor Lay-
cock identifies.3" This type is a subset of substantive neutrality that divides that
standard into separate tests of "no advancement" of religion and "no inhibition"
of religion.31 "Substantive neutrality always requires that the encouragement of
one policy be compared to the discouragement of alternative policies. '32 In
other words, substantive neutrality examines a law's effects on both the ad-
vancement and the inhibition of religion. Disaggregated neutrality, on the oth-
er hand, examines whether a law's substantial effect is either to advance relig-
ion or to inhibit religion. 33 Thus, "[i]f a law has some substantial effect that
advances religion, that may be the end of the case."34
B. Nonpreferentialism
A different form of accommodation, which stands in sharp contrast to neu-
trality, is nonpreferentialism. On Professor Smith's continuum, nonpreferen-
tialism is at the opposite end of the spectrum from neutrality and lies much
closer to the theocratic view.35 The basic premise of nonpreferentialism is that
the Establishment Clause forbids only "the establishment of a national church
or religion, or the placing of any one religious sect, denomination, or tradition,
into a preferred legal status."36 Stated affirmatively, nonpreferentialism per-
mits the government to confer
special aid or benefits upon religion in general, as long as the aid or bene-
fits are given without preference to any religious denominations .... [T]he
Establishment Clause aims to keep the government from singling out cer-
tain religious sects for preferential treatment, but it does not prevent the
government from showing favoritism to religion in general.37
understanding of neutrality. He contends that substantive neutrality is more difficult to apply
than formal neutrality because it "requires judgments about the relative significance of vari-
ous encouragements and discouragements to religion." Id. at 1004.
30 Id. at 1007.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1008.
33 Id. at 1007.
34 Id.
31 Smith, supra note 20, at 250-51.
36 Robert L. Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of
the First Amendment, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 138 (1986).
37 Garry, supra note 8, at 3. See also Richard M. Esenberg, You Cannot Lose If You
Choose Not ToPlay: Toward A More Modest Establishment Clause, 12 ROoER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 1, 15 (2006-07) (asserting that nonpreferentialism does "not require evenhandedness
between 'religion' and 'irreligion'" and permits government to "promote religion generally
as long as it does not prefer one sect over another"). Professor Rodney Smith identifies three
types of nonpreferentialism: (1) "religious nonpreferentialism", which is the "view that gov-
ernment may aid or accommodate 'religion' so long as it does so in a nonpreferential man-
ner"; (2) "nonpreference as to matters of conscience", which is the "view that government
[Vol. 18:67
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A majority of the Court has never adopted nonpreferentialism, but former
Chief Justice Rehnquist was a strong proponent of this doctrine. In a forceful
dissenting opinion in the 1985 case of Wallace v. Jaffree, which involved a
"moment of silence" law, then-Justice Rehnquist rejected the neutrality princi-
ple and asserted that nonpreferentialism should be the interpretive standard for
the Establishment Clause.38 As explained in more detail below, other members
of the Court, including Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ken-
nedy, and Alito, subsequently have taken positions consistent with Rehnquist's
position.3 9
C. The Supreme Court's Application of the Competing Standards
1. Substantive Neutrality
Prior to Rehnquist' s advocacy of nonpreferentialism, the Court generally em-
ployed some form of neutrality. It adopted a substantive neutrality standard in
Everson,40 which upheld a New Jersey program authorizing reimbursement for
parents of parochial school students who traveled to school on the public bus
system. 41 Justice Black set forth the Court's first significant attempt to define
the meaning of the Establishment Clause, stating that the
"establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go
to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for enter-
taining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, par-
may aid those seeking to act in accordance with their conscience"; and (3) "nonpreferential-
ism between religion and nonreligion", which is the "view that government may aid religion
when to fail to do so would demonstrate a preference for nonreligion." Smith, supra note
20, at 247-48.
38 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99-100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39 See e.g., McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 885 (2005)
(Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting); Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492
U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Garry,
supra note 6, at 51 (stating that "[t]he courts have come part of the way toward recognition
of the nonpreferential model" by upholding government funding programs that aid religion
and upholding tax breaks given to religious organizations).
40 Everson v. Bd. of Edu. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
41 Id.
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ticipate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of relig-
ion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church and
State."42
The articulation of this neutrality principle was a watershed moment be-
cause, "[p]rior to 1947, the Supreme Court had not, in any significant way,
addressed itself to either the meaning or the scope of the Establishment
Clause's prohibitions on the power of Congress. 43
The Court considered the reimbursement program's effects on both the ad-
vancement and inhibition of religion. Justice Black admitted that "[ilt is un-
doubtedly true that children are helped to get to church schools[,]" and that
"[lt]here is even a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the
church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares
out of their own pockets when transportation to a public school would have
been paid for by the State."' Conversely, New Jersey could not inhibit its
citizens' religious exercise by denying them the benefits of public welfare leg-
islation based on their religion.45 Balancing these competing concerns, the
Court held that New Jersey met the neutrality requirement because it paid the
bus fares through a general program that "help[ed] parents get their children,
regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited
schools. 4 6
Soon after Everson, the Court applied a substantive neutrality standard to
religious instruction in public schools. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education, 47 the Court considered a challenge to a program through which pub-
lic school students were "released" during school hours to attend classes in
religious instruction. 48 Teachers employed by a private religious group taught
the classes, which occurred on school grounds.49
The Court struck down the program, reiterating that government may not
"pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another."5 The program violated this principle because it was "beyond all
question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school
system to aid religious groups to spread their faith."'" The Court based this
42 Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
43 Cord, supra note 36, at 148.
4 Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
45 Id. at 16.
46 Id. at 18. The dissent advocated a strict separationist interpretation. Id. at 31-32 (Rut-
ledge, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, JJ., dissenting).
47 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
48 Id. at 205-06. Students needed parental consent to attend the religious classes. Id. at
206.
49 Id. at 207-09.
50 Id. at 210.
51 Id.
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conclusion on the program's effects, pointing out that it let religious groups use
public school buildings and the state's compulsory education system to teach
classes in religion.52 Conversely, the Court noted that prohibiting public school
systems from aiding the spread of religious doctrines does not manifest govern-
ment hostility to religion.
5 3
2. Disaggregated Substantive Neutrality
a. The Emergence of Disaggregated Neutrality
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court shifted away
from traditional substantive neutrality and applied a disaggregated neutrality
standard to religious exercises in public schools.5 4 At issue in Schempp were
mandates in Pennsylvania and Baltimore requiring students to recite Bible
verses at the beginning of each school day.5 5 The Court held that these prac-
tices violated the Establishment Clause.
5 6
Justice Clark wrote for the majority in Schempp. Relying on Everson, he
reiterated that the First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers[.] ' ' 5' He also
pointed out that the Court had rejected the claim that the Establishment Clause
forbids "only government preference of one religion over another."58 Rather,
neutrality prohibited both government preference among religions and prefer-
ence for religion over nonreligion. Justice Clark explained the rationale for this
prohibition:
[t]he wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus stems
from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups
might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a
concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official sup-
52 Id. at 211-12.
" Id. at 211. McCollum also expressly rejected nonpreferentialism. The school board's
lawyers had advocated that standard, arguing that "the First Amendment was intended to
forbid only government preference of one religion over another, not an impartial governmen-
tal assistance of all religions." Id. The Court rejected this argument unequivocally. Id. at
211-12.
54 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Just prior to Schempp, the Court applied the neutrality standard
in Engel v. Vitale to hold unconstitutional teacher-led prayers in public schools. 370 U.S.
421 (1962). At issue was a requirement that students recite the following "Regents' Prayer"
at the beginning of each school day: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country." Id. at
422-23. The Court held that this exercise violated the Establishment Clause because it offi-
cially established the religious beliefs embodied in the prayer. Id. at 425, 430. The fact that
the prayer was "denominationally neutral" did not save it. Id. at 430.
55 Sch. Dist of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205-11 (1963).
56 Id. at 223-25.
57 Id. at 218.
58 Id. at 219 (citing McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211).
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port of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets
of one or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. 9
Justice Clark's analysis culminated in a test for determining neutrality, which
he phrased in the following question and answer: "what are the purpose and the
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circum-
scribed by the Constitution. "60 In other words, "to withstand the strictures of
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. '61 This test is the clas-
sic formulation of disaggregated neutrality.62
Applying this test, the Court held that the purpose of the required Bible read-
ings was to aid religion. 63 The Court agreed with the finding that the Penn-
sylvania practice was "a religious ceremony and was intended by the State to
be so." 64 Baltimore's assertion that its practice had secular purposes, such as
promoting moral values, contradicting "materialistic trends," and teaching liter-
ature, was belied by the fact that students could opt out of the readings and that
the allegedly secular purposes were pursued through readings from a religious
text.65 Thus, the Court concluded that Pennsylvania and Baltimore violated the
First Amendment's command "that the Government maintain strict neutrality,
neither aiding nor opposing religion. '"66
The Court applied this disaggregated neutrality standard to school curricu-
lum in Epperson v. Arkansas, which presented a challenge to Arkansas's anti-
evolution statute. 67 The statute made it a misdemeanor "for a teacher in any
state-supported school or university to 'teach the theory or doctrine that man-
kind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals,' or 'to adopt or use
in any such institution a textbook that teaches' this theory.'"68
The Supreme Court forcefully struck down the statute as a violation of the
Establishment Clause.69 Maintaining its reliance on the neutrality principle, the
Court stated that "[g]overnment in our democracy, state and national, must be
59 Id. at 222.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See Laycock, supra note25, at 1007.
63 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222-24.
64 Id. at 223.
65 Id. at 223-24.
66 Id. at 225.
67 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968).
68 Id. at 98-99 (internal citation omitted). The Arkansas statute was modeled after the
Tennessee "monkey law" challenged in Scopes v. Tennessee, 278 S.W. 57 (Tenn. 1925).
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98 & n.2.
69 The Arkansas Supreme Court had refused to decide the statute's validity under the
Federal Constitution and had upheld it as a valid exercise of the state's power to prescribe
the curriculum in its public schools. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 101.
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neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice."7 In its strongest
rejection yet of nonpreferentialism, the Court placed religion and nonreligion
on the same plane and explained that government may not favor or oppose
either:
It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion; and
it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against
another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment man-
dates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and nonreligion.71
In the context of school curriculum, this prohibition "forbids alike the prefer-
ence of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antag-
onistic to a particular dogma."72 The purpose of the Arkansas statute was to
advance religion by suppressing the "teaching of a theory which, it was
thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man."73 It therefore was not "an act of
religious neutrality. 74
b. The Decline of Disaggregated Neutrality
Epperson was a high point in the Court's use of disaggregated neutrality and
the broader principle of substantive neutrality. Just three years later, in Lemon
v. Kurtzman,75 the Court began retreating from substantive neutrality and un-
dertook an internal debate over the governing standard for the Establishment
Clause. Ostensibly, Lemon addressed the constitutionality of state statutes au-
thorizing salary supplements to teachers in non-public schools, and the Court
held that the statutes violated the Establishment Clause.76 Lemon's true signifi-
cance, however, lies not in that result, but in its change to the Court's Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority in Lemon, and he did not invoke
neutrality as a guiding principle. Rather, he emphasized the Court's struggle to
articulate a clear and consistent interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Calling the language of the Religion Clauses "at best opaque," Burger stated
that the Court could "only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this ex-
traordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law."77 He then combined the "cu-
mulative criteria" that the Court had considered in prior cases and created the
70 Id. at 103-04.
71 Id. at 104.
72 Id. at 107.
73 Id. at 109.
74 Id.
75 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
76 Id. at 606-07. One of the statutes also allowed reimbursement for textbooks and in-
structional materials in specified secular subjects. Id. at 607.
77 Id. at 612.
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now infamous "Lemon Test. ' 78 Two of the test's criteria were Schempp's dis-
aggregated neutrality standard: whether a statute has a (1) a secular legislative
purpose, and (2) a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.79
Burger added a third criterion: "the statute must not foster 'an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement' with religion., 8 0 Thus, neutrality was no longer the
sole measure for assessing the constitutionality of government action.
The Court's analysis of the challenged statutes demonstrated its diminution
of substantive neutrality. The Court agreed that the statutes had the secular
purpose of enhancing the quality of education in all schools.8 ' It then declined
to consider the statutes' effect on advancing religion, thus avoiding the core
inquiry of substantive neutrality.82 Instead, the Court held that the statutes vio-
lated the Establishment Clause because they created excessive entanglement
between religion and government.8 3 The Court's entanglement analysis sig-
naled a further retreat from Everson's "wall of separation." According to Chief
Justice Burger, "the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particu-
lar relationship. 84 Thus, after Lemon, neutrality was no longer paramount, and
the wall of separation was neither high nor impregnable.
3. Formal Neutrality
In the wake of Lemon, the Court further diminished substantive neutrality by
applying formal neutrality in other cases, especially those involving govern-
ment financial aid to religious schools. An example of the use of formal neu-
trality is Mueller v. Allen, 85 which presented a challenge to a Minnesota statute
that allowed an income tax deduction for childhood educational expenses, in-
cluding the costs of tuition, textbooks, and transportation. 6 The deduction was
available to all parents, including those whose children attended parochial
78 Id.
'9 Id. See also Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46
EMORY L.J. 43, 56 (1997) (stating that "[tihe first two prongs of the Lemon test are taken
almost verbatim from the Court's elaboration of 'benevolent neutrality' in Abington School
District v. Schempp"); cf also Werhan, supra note 6, at 608 (asserting that first prong of
Lemon test, "which inquires into the religious neutrality of the governmental purpose moti-
vating the challenged statute, might be understood as 'purposive neutrality."').
80 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 613-14.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 614.
85 463 U.S. 388 (1983). The Court also has applied formal neutrality in other cases in-
volving government financial aid. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509
U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
86 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391.
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schools.87
According to the Court, the "more difficult" question in the case was wheth-
er the statute had the primary effect of advancing religion.88 In assessing the
effect, however, the Court disregarded the statute's actual impact and its benefit
to religious schools. Despite uncontroverted evidence that the overwhelming
majority of parents eligible for the deduction had children who attended relig-
ious schools, the Court found this information irrelevant in assessing the stat-
ute's effect.89 Instead, the Court focused on the statute's supposed facial neu-
trality, emphasizing that the deduction was available to all parents and that aid
to parochial schools resulted only from the private decisions of individual par-
ents. 90 Therefore, according to Mueller, government action did not advance
religion so long as the action was facially neutral and did not confer benefits
based on religion, even if its actual impact was to significantly assist religion.9'
Thus, Mueller further weakened the neutrality principle by disregarding the
substantive neutrality standard that the Court had followed in earlier cases such
as McCollum and Schempp.92
4. Accommodating Religion Based on History
The Court further weakened substantive neutrality in Lynch v. Donnelly93 by
adding an accommodation provision to the neutrality analysis. Lynch presented
a challenge to a municipality's inclusion of a creche in its annual Christmas
display. 94 Although ostensibly following Lemon, the Court significantly under-
mined its neutrality element by declaring that the Constitution does not require
"complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommo-
87 Id. at 397.
88 Id. at 396. The Court quickly found that the statute's asserted purpose-defraying
parents' educational expenses-was both valid and secular. Id. at 395. It also had "no
difficulty" in concluding that the statute did not excessively entangle the state in religion.
Id. at 403.
89 Id. at 400-01.
90 Id. at 398-99.
91 Id. at 401.
92 See, e.g., Werhan, supra note 8, at 613-14 ("The Mueller transformation of the second
element of Lemon, coupled with the Mueller Court's ritual disregard of the purpose require-
ment, left the Establishment Clause seriously weakened .... ). Werhan asserts that Justice
Rehnquist recast Lemon's second element
from an analysis of the substantive neutrality of the state benefit to what Douglas Lay-
cock has labeled the 'formal neutrality' of the law that provided the benefit. Rather
than assessing the record to measure the actual effect of the tax deduction, the Court in
Mueller largely reduced the second element of Lemon to a textual review of the law
providing for the benefit in order to determine whether the language was religiously
neutral.
Id. at 612.
93 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
94 id. at 670-71.
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dation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any." 95 According to the Court, this accommodation requirement was evi-
denced by "an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three
branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at least
1789. "96
In light of this history, the majority focused "on the creche in the context of
the Christmas season ' 97 and ruled that it satisfied the Lemon criteria.98 Con-
ceding that "the display advances religion in a sense," the majority nonetheless
declared that "our precedents plainly contemplate that on occasion some ad-
vancement of religion will result from governmental action."99 Thus, even
though the government's display of the creche admittedly advanced religion
and promoted major tenets of the Christian faith, the Court upheld it as a lawful
accommodation of religion. 100
5. The Emergence of Nonpreferentialism
The foregoing discussion illustrates the various definitions of neutrality that
the Court employed after Everson. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 101 however, the de-
bate over the meaning of the Establishment Clause took on broader ramifica-
tions. It shifted from the definition of neutrality, and the type of neutrality that
the Court would apply, to the more fundamental question of whether neutrality
should continue to be the Court's guiding principle.
Wallace presented the constitutionality of an Alabama statute authorizing a
period of silence in public schools for "meditation or voluntary prayer."" 2 Fol-
lowing Lemon and incorporating part of Justice O'Connor's endorsement
test,"°3 the majority found that Alabama had enacted the statute "for the sole
purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one min-
ute at the beginning of each school day."' 4 Such endorsement, the majority
ruled, "is not consistent with the established principle that the government must
95 Id. at 673.
96 Id. at 674.
97 Id. at 679.
98 Id. at 685.
99 Id. at 683.
100 In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor suggested an "endorsement" test as a clari-
fication of Lemon's purpose and effects prongs. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688-89 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Under this test, the purpose inquiry should be "whether the government intends
to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion[," and the effects inquiry
should be whether the government has in fact communicated a message of "endorsement or
disapproval of religion." Id. at 691-92.
101 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
102 Id. at 41-42 (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1984)).
103 Id. at 55-56.
'04 Id. at 60.
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pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion."' 5
Wallace's true significance, however, lies not in the majority opinion, but in
the bold dissent of then-Justice Rehnquist. In his dissent, Rehnquist challenged
forty years of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, asserting that Everson's
"wall of separation" metaphor was "a mistaken understanding of constitutional
history." 106 To correct this purported mistake, he urged the Court to adopt an-
other interpretation of the Establishment Clause, one that has come to be
known as nonpreferentialism.
10 7
Rehnquist based his argument on the statements of James Madison and
others involved in drafting and ratifying the Establishment Clause. 108 From
that history, Rehnquist concluded that Madison viewed the Establishment
Clause "as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and
perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring
neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligion."' 9
Based on this historical analysis, Rehnquist asserted that the Establishment
Clause prohibits only two government actions: establishment of a national
church and government preference among religious denominations." 0 Con-
versely, he asserted that the Clause "did not require government neutrality be-
tween religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government from
providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion.""' Since government neutrality
was not required, according to Rehnquist, the wall of separation and Lemon's
purpose and effects criteria should be abandoned because they rested on the
"historically unsound" neutrality premise.
112
Rehnquist's advocacy of nonpreferentialism was significant for several rea-
sons. As Professor Cord has explained,
105 Id.
106 Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1o7 See Smith, supra note 20, at 247-48, 268.
'08 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'09 Id. at 98. Rehnquist added that Congress was not concerned about "whether the Gov-
ernment might aid all religions evenhandedly." Id. at 99.
1o Id. at 106. Professor Laycock calls nonpreferentialism a "false claim" and argues that
the "framers of the religion clauses certainly did not consciously intend to permit nonprefer-
ential aid, and those of them who thought about the question probably intended to forbid it."
Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent,
27 WM. & MARv L. REV. 875, 878 (1985-1986). He asserts that nonpreferentialism's
"prominence and longevity" are "remarkable in light of the weak evidence supporting it and
the quite strong evidence against it." Id. at 877. Professor Smith, on the other hand, calls
nonpreferentialism "one among a number of plausible readings of the history[.]" Smith,
supra note 20, at 247; see also Cord, supra note 36, at 147 ("the 'no-preference' interpreta-
tion of Church-State separation is the one that the Framers intended and the Founding Fa-
thers embraced.").
'". Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 107-110.
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[u]ntil the Supreme Court's 1984 term, no sitting justice had clearly and
forcefully challenged Everson's "high and impregnable wall" doctrine.
That unity of Church-State ideology was shattered by Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree. Adopting the "no preference" doctrine as his
own, and presenting some of the historical evidence that supports it, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in a single opinion, called into question some of the
Court's most fundamental assumptions about the degree of separation be-
tween Church and State required by the Constitution.
1 1 3
While other justices had suggested different neutrality standards, Rehnquist
questioned the basic premise of neutrality and asserted that the Establishment
Clause does not require it.' 14 The question left after Wallace was whether
Rehnquist could garner a majority to abandon neutrality altogether and adopt a
standard permitting government to favor religion over nonreligion.
The answer to that question came just one month later in School District of
Grand Rapids v. Ball." 5 Ball involved a challenge to a state program through
which teachers employed by the public schools went to the campuses of non-
public schools (primarily religious schools) and taught remedial and supple-
mentary courses.' 16 Although the Court ruled the program unconstitutional be-
cause its primary effect was promoting religion, the case demonstrates the tenu-
ous hold of the neutrality principle. 1 7  The majority felt obliged to
preemptively reject nonpreferentialism, declaring that the Establishment Clause
is "more than a pledge that no single religion will be designated as a state
religion" and "more than a mere injunction that governmental programs dis-
criminating among religions are unconstitutional."' 18 The Court also reaf-
firmed that government must "maintain a course of neutrality among religions,
and between religion and nonreligion."' 9 Justice Rehnquist, however, made
clear that the battle between neutrality and nonpreferentialism was far from
settled. Criticizing the majority's reliance on the "faulty 'wall' premise," he
dissented for the same reasons as in Wallace. 2°
113 Cord, supra note 36, at 169.
114 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Establishment Clause did
not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Fed-
eral Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion").
115 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
116 Id. at 375-77.
117 Id. at 397. Ball was subsequently overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997). Agostini did not overrule Ball's use of the Lemon standard. Rather, it overruled
certain factual assumptions that Ball had relied on to find that the challenged program had
the primary effect of promoting religion. 521 U.S. at 222-23.
"18 Ball, 473 U.S. at 381.
119 Id. at 382.
120 Id. at 400-01 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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D. Other Justices Align With Elements of Rehnquist's Nonpreferentialist
Standard
1. Justice Scalia
Although Justice Rehnquist's view did not prevail in Wallace or Ball, three
Justices-Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-have taken positions consistent with
Rehnquist's nonpreferentialist standard in subsequent cases. Justice Scalia
joined Rehnquist's nonpreferentialist cause in Edwards v. Aguillard, 121 which
raised the constitutionality of Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-
Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act."' 22 The Act
forbade the teaching of evolution unless it was "accompanied by instruction in
creation science."'' 23 Neither evolution nor creation science was required to be
taught, but if one was taught, then the other had to be taught as well.1
24
The majority applied the Lemon criteria and struck down the Act for lack of
a secular purpose, finding that its aim was to advance a religious belief-crea-
tionism-and discredit a scientific theory-evolution. 125 Justice Scalia, how-
ever, wrote a dissenting opinion that then-Chief Justice Rehnquist joined.
Scalia accepted, without question, the state's assertion that creation science was
a scientific theory, disregarding its religious origins and concluding that "[tihe
people of Louisiana, including those who are Christian fundamentalists, are
quite entitled, as a secular matter, to have whatever scientific evidence there
may be against evolution presented in their schools [.]1
26
Scalia then urged the Court to abandon the purpose criterion altogether, re-
peating Rehnquist's criticism that Lemon was "a constitutional theory [that] has
no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks to interpret[.]' 12 7 In advocat-
ing this change, Scalia stated that it is "far from an inevitable reading of the
Establishment Clause that it forbids all governmental action intended to ad-
vance religion; and if not inevitable, any reading with such untoward conse-
121 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 580-81 (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1-17:286.7 (1982)).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 585-88, 593. The Court rejected the asserted secular purpose of protecting "aca-
demic freedom" because the Act's operation did not further that objective. Id. at 586-88.
The majority also noted that special concerns exist in applying the Lemon criteria in the
public school context, such as the fact that attendance is mandatory, that school children are
impressionable, and that parents "condition their trust [in the public schools] on the under-
standing that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may
conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family." Id. at 584. Of the five
justices who recognized these concerns, only Justice Stevens remains on the Court today.
126 Id. at 611-12, 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He reached that conclusion despite his
concession that "creation science coincides with the beliefs of certain religions[.]" Id. at
616.
127 Id. at 636 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing)).
2008]
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL
quences must be wrong."' 8 Thus, Scalia aligned himself with Rehnquist's
view that the Establishment Clause allows government to favor and advance
religion over nonreligion.
2. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy's opportunity to express his views on the neutrality princi-
ple and nonpreferentialism came in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Lib-
erties Union, which involved a challenge to holiday displays including a creche
in a county courthouse and a menorah outside a government administration
building.'29 The justices divided sharply, and there was no majority opinion.
Applying various standards, a majority of the Court held that the display in-
cluding the creche violated the Establishment Clause but that the display in-
cluding the menorah did not.'3°
Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in the menorah ruling and dis-
senting from the creche ruling, which Rehnquist, Scalia, and White joined.'3 '
Kennedy proposed a new standard based on coercion and accommodation that
substantially diminished the principle of neutrality. He asserted that the
Court's past declarations that government must be neutral in matters of religion
"must not give the impression of a formalism that does not exist."' 13 2 "Rather
than requiring government to avoid any action that acknowledges or aids relig-
ion, the Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing
and accommodating the central role religion plays in our society."' 33 Kennedy
identified two principles that limit this "latitude" to accommodate religion: (1)
"government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or
its exercise"; and (2) government "may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or
callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in
fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith.'"""
In Kennedy's opinion, neither the creche nor the menorah violated these lim-
its. "' Despite the two symbols' religious nature, he concluded that government
had not exceeded its power to accommodate religion because it had not com-
pelled anyone to participate in a religious activity, and it had not contributed
"significant amounts of tax money to serve the cause of one religious faith."'136
For Kennedy, the displays were constitutional because there was "no realistic
risk that the creche and the menorah represent an effort to proselytize or are
128 Id. at 639.
129 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
130 Id. at 579.
131 Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
132 Id. at 656-57.
133 Id. at 657.
134 Id. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
135 Id. at 655.
136 Id. at 664.
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otherwise the first step down the road to an establishment of religion."' 37 Sig-
nificantly, Kennedy's coercion standard is consistent with nonpreferentialism,
because it permits government actions that favor religion over nonreligion, so
long as those actions stop short of establishing a state religion or coercing par-
ticipation in or support for religion.
3. Justice Thomas
The Court later adopted Kennedy's coercion standard in two cases involving
prayer at public school functions: Lee v. Weisman 138 and Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe. 139 In Lee, a majority led by Justice Kennedy applied
the coercion standard to find unconstitutional clergy-led invocations and bene-
dictions at graduation ceremonies.' In Santa Fe, a majority applied the coer-
cion standard, among others, to hold unconstitutional a policy permitting stu-
dents to vote on having student-led invocations at high school football
games.' 4 1 Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissent-
ed in both cases.'
42
Although Rehnquist and Scalia supported the coercion standard in County of
Allegheny, 143 they abandoned it in Lee, and Justice Thomas joined them.'
14
Penning the dissent, Scalia asserted that the coercion standard in Lee disregard-
ed the Court's obligation to construe the Establishment Clause "in light of the
'[g]ovemment policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for
religion [that] are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage.'"' 4 5
He accused the majority of ignoring history and the "longstanding American
13' Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664.
138 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
139 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
140 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. The School Committee permitted school principals to invite the
clergy members to deliver the prayers. Principals gave clergy members written guidelines
regarding the prayers' content. Id. at 581. Justice Souter joined the majority and also wrote
a concurrence noting the vitality of the neutrality standard. He asserted that, by holding
"state-sponsored prayers in public schools" to be unconstitutional "no matter how nonde-
nominational the prayers may be", the Court had reaffirmed Everson's principle that govern-
ment may not favor religion in general or one religion over another. Id. at 610-11 (Souter,
J., concurring).
"' Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302-07. Following Lee, the majority held that even if attend-
ance at games was voluntary, "the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of
coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship." Id. at 312. The majori-
ty also analyzed the policy under the endorsement test and Lemon and held that it failed
those tests as well. Id. at 307-08, 314-15.
142 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting);
Lee, 505 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, White, and Thomas, JJ., and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
143 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992).
145 Lee, 505 U.S. at 631 (quoting Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573,
657, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
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tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally."' 146 He
declared that it was "senseless" to deprive society of public group prayer "in
order to spare the nonbeliever . . . the minimal inconvenience of standing or
even sitting in respectful nonparticipation[.]' 47 Justice Thomas joined all of
these views.'
48
II. A CURRENT SNAPSHOT OF THE DEBATE OVER ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE STANDARDS
As the previous section demonstrates, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace
initiated a debate over the larger question of whether neutrality should continue
to be the Court's touchstone for interpreting the Establishment Clause. Three
of the Court's most recent cases-Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,149 Van Orden v.
Perry,'50 and McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ken-
tucky' 5 1-show that this debate has continued to intensify. This trio of cases
provides a current snapshot of the Justices' views on neutrality and nonprefer-
entialisms.
A. Formal Neutrality
In 2002, the Court returned to formal neutrality in Zelman v. Simmons-Har-
ris, a case challenging Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program.152 The pro-
gram provided tuition vouchers for students to use at private schools, including
religious schools.1 53 Students qualified for the vouchers if they attended a
school district that was or had been "under federal court order requiring super-
vision and operational management of the district by the state superinten-
dent."' 154 At the time of the case, the Cleveland public school system was the
only district eligible for the program.'55 Of the 3700 students who enrolled in
the program during the 1999 - 2000 school year, ninety-six percent used the
vouchers to attend religious schools. 156 Because the program had resulted
146 Id. at 631-32.
147 Id. at 646.
148 Id. at 644. Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas dissented in Santa Fe, but they did not
criticize the coercion standard as they had in Lee. 530 U.S. at 318-320 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Instead, they tried to rebut the majority's arguments regarding endorsement and
the Lemon criteria. Id.
149 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
150 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
15' 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
152 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
153 Id. at 644-46.
154 Id. at 644-45 (quoting OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3313,975(A)(West 2000)).
155 Id. at 645. Cleveland's schools were "among the worst-performing in the nation." Id.
at 644.
156 Id. at 647. Forty-six of the fifty-six participating private schools had a religious affili-
ation. Id.
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largely in financing attendance at religious schools, plaintiffs challenged it as a
violation of the Establishment Clause.
157
A majority of the Court-including Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-
applied a formal neutrality standard to uphold the program.158 Because the
program had a secular purpose- "providing educational assistance to poor
children in a demonstrably-failing public school system" -the only issue was
whether the program had the effect of advancing religion.'59 The majority
identified two factors that determine whether a government program advances
religion: (1) whether its benefits are available "to a broad class of citizens de-
fined without reference to religion"160 ; and (2) whether those benefits are di-
rected to religious institutions as a result of the recipients' "genuine and inde-
pendent private choice . . 161 If those questions can be answered in the
affirmative, the program is neutral and does not impermissibly advance relig-
ion. 162
The Ohio program satisfied these criteria because it provided the vouchers to
students irrespective of their religion, and the students chose to use the vouch-
ers at religious schools. 163 More significantly, the majority held that the
amount of aid that such private choices channel to religious institutions is irrel-
evant to the constitutional inquiry."64 According to the Court, "[t]he constitu-
tionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether
and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run
by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a relig-
ious school."'165 The fact that ninety-six percent of the participating students
had used the vouchers to attend religious schools therefore was of no conse-
quence to the Zelman majority.
1 66
In a strong dissent, Justice Souter pointed out the ramifications of the majori-
ty's standard. Accusing the majority of ignoring Everson's neutrality principle,
he explained that "it was not until today that substantiality of aid has clearly
157 Id. at 648.
158 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-52.
159 Id. at 649.
160 Id. at 651.
161 Id. at 652.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 662-63.
'64 Id. at 651.
165 Id. at 658.
166 By permitting assistance to religion on a nondiscriminatory basis, this formal neutrali-
ty standard shares characteristics of nonpreferentialism. Professor Gey asserts that the non-
preferentialist interpretation is "inherent in the formal neutrality standard, since under a for-
mal neutrality standard the government would be permitted to fund many different churches,
which conforms to the gist of the nonpreferential notion that the government may establish
religion in general so long as it does not favor a particular sect." Gey, supra note 3, at 40-
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been rejected as irrelevant by a majority of this Court, just as it has not been
until today that a majority, not a plurality, has held purely formal criteria to
suffice for scrutinizing aid that ends up in the coffers of religious schools." 167
Justice Souter urged a return to substantive neutrality: "to apply the neutrality
test, then, it makes sense to focus on a category of aid that may be directed to
religious as well as secular schools, and ask whether the scheme favors a relig-
ious direction."
' 168
B. Accommodation, Substantive Neutrality, and Nonpreferentialism
A pair of 2005 cases involving Ten Commandments displays further illus-
trates the Court's ongoing debate over neutrality, accommodation, and non-
preferentialism. Van Orden v. Perry involved a challenge to a forty-year-old
monument of the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds.
169
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky involved a
challenge to Ten Commandments displays recently hung on the walls of county
courthouses. 170 Issuing its decisions on the same day, the Court upheld the Tex-
as display and struck down the Kentucky displays. In doing so, various justices
urged standards of accommodation, substantive neutrality, and nonpreferential-
ism.
There was no majority opinion in Van Orden.171 Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote a plurality opinion that Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.
172
Rehnquist disregarded Lemon, basing his analysis instead on "our Nation's his-
tory" and "the nature of the monument."' 73 With respect to history, Rehnquist
asserted "that there is an unbroken history of official acknowledgement by all
three branches of government of the role of religion in American life.' ' 174 In-
voking nonpreferentialism, he further asserted that the Court has not, and does
not, "adhere to the principle that the Establishment Clause bars any and all
167 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 688, 695 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Salamanca, supra note
28, at 576 (arguing that Zelman Court "took a large step away from ostensible substantive
neutrality and toward formal neutrality as the touchstone for non-establishment"); Ravitch,
supra note 28, at 493 (Zelman shows that the Court is moving toward making formal "neu-
trality the centerpiece of Establishment Clause jurisprudence."); cf. also id. at 532 ("[A]n
argument could be made that aspects of the Rehnquist Court's formal neutrality come closer
to nonpreferentialism than it might appear at first glance.").
168 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 697 (Souter, J., dissenting). See Ravitch, supra note 28, at 504 &
n.92 (calling Souter's dissent "the most eloquent plea for substantive neutrality in recent
years[.]").
169 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
170 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
171 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677.
172 Id. at 680-81.
173 Id. at 686.
174 Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984)).
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governmental preference for religion over irreligion." '175 With respect to the
nature of the monument, Rehnquist found that the Ten Commandments had
both religious and historical significance and that the monument was a "pas-
sive" use of the Ten Commandments.17 6 Based on the Ten Commandments'
dual significance and the nation's history of acknowledging religion, Rehnquist
concluded that the monument did not violate the Establishment Clause.
1 77
Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence reiterating his call to change the Court's
doctrine. He stated that he would have preferred to uphold the monument
by adopting an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with
our Nation's past and present practices, and that can be consistently ap-
plied-the central relevant feature of which is that there is nothing uncon-
stitutional in a State's favoring religion generally, honoring God through
public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, ven-
erating the Ten Commandments.
178
Thus, Scalia directly renewed the call to adopt nonpreferentialism.,
79
While Justice Thomas joined the plurality, he also wrote a separate concur-
rence asserting that the text and history of the Establishment Clause "resis[t]
incorporation against the States."' 80 Moreover, even assuming that the Estab-
lishment Clause governs the states, he took a much more narrow view of its
scope. Thomas argued that the framers understood the word "establishment" to
require "actual legal coercion" by force of law or threat of penalty. 8 1 In the
absence of such coercion, there is no establishment. Thus, Thomas concluded
that the Texas display was not an establishment of religion because its presence
did not coerce observers to do anything.
8 2
Justices Stevens and Souter dissented and wrote separate opinions calling for
175 Id. at 684, n.3.
176 Id. at 690-92.
177 Id. at 691-92.
178 Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 885-894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
179 See, e.g., Esenberg, supra note 37, at 57 (noting that Scalia's concurrence advocated a
nonpreferentialist standard).
180 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 844, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment)). Thomas also took this position in Zelman. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 678-79 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
181 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
182 Id. at 694. Justice Breyer did not join the plurality's analysis, but he too struck a blow
against the neutrality principle. In a separate concurrence, he declared that "tests designed to
measure 'neutrality' alone are insufficient" because it "can be difficult to determine when a
legal rule is 'neutral' and because" strict neutrality can foster hostility to religion. Id. at 699
(Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). Instead of neutrality, Breyer advocated the use of an
amorphous "legal judgment" standard. Id. at 700.
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the continued use of the neutrality standard. Expressly rejecting Scalia's call
for nonpreferentialism, Stevens argued that the Establishment Clause demands
neutrality in two respects: "government may not exercise a preference for one
religious faith over another," and it may not "aid all religions as against non-
believers."' 183 In his opinion, the Texas display violated these precepts because
it preferred religion over nonreligion and prescribed a "code of conduct from
one God, namely a Judeo-Christian God," that polytheistic and nontheistic
sects, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, reject.'84 By upholding a state display
of a sacred religious text, the plurality had made "a mockery of the constitu-
tional ideal that government must remain neutral between religion and irrelig-
ion."185
In light of Van Orden, the Court appeared on the verge of abandoning the
neutrality principle once and for all. Five justices had criticized the principle in
varying degrees and rejected it in upholding the Texas display. However, on
the very same day that he joined the judgment in Van Orden and criticized the
neutrality principle, Justice Breyer, without explanation, provided the crucial
fifth vote for a majority opinion in McCreary County that embraced substantive
neutrality and struck down the Kentucky Ten Commandments displays.
In McCreary, the Ten Commandments were posted on the walls of court-
houses in two counties.'86 County officials originally posted only the Com-
mandments. After a lawsuit was filed, the display was modified twice and
ultimately included nine framed documents: the King James Version of the Ten
Commandments, "the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill
of Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the
National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of
Lady Justice. '187 The Court evaluated the constitutionality of this third display.
Justice Souter wrote for the majority, which included Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer. He immediately invoked neutrality, declar-
ing that the "[t]ouchstone for our analysis is the principle that the 'First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion,
and between religion and nonreligion."',188 According to Souter, Lemon's pur-
pose prong is a core component of the neutrality principle, because "[w]hen the
government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing re-
ligion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious
neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government's ostensible object is
183 Id. at 709-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495
(1961)).
184 Id. at 719.
185 Id. at 735. Justice Souter agreed that "the Establishment Clause requires neutrality as
a general rule[.]" Id. at 737 (Souter, J., dissenting).
186 McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005).
187 Id. at 855-56.
188 Id. at 860 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
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to take sides."'189 After this strong reaffirmation of the neutrality principle and
Lemon, the majority held that the Kentucky displays had the unmistakable pur-
pose of advancing religion and therefore were unconstitutional. 90
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, asserted that the Court should abandon neutrality altogether. 9 Scalia
pointed to historical government acknowledgments of religion, such as prayers
at sessions of Congress and the Supreme Court, paid congressional chaplains,
and presidential proclamations. 192 Scalia argued that these practices proved
that the framers intended to include religion in public life. 193 After reciting this
history, he asked,
[w]ith all of this reality (and much more) staring it in the face, how can the
Court possibly assert that "the First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between . . . religion and nonreligion," ... and that
"[m]anifesting a purpose to favor.., adherence to religion generally," ...
is unconstitutional? Who says so? Surely not the words of the Constitu-
tion. Surely not the history and traditions that reflect our society's con-
stant understanding of those words. 194
According to Scalia, "[n]othing stands behind the Court's assertion that gov-
ernmental affirmation of the society's belief in God is unconstitutional except
the Court's own say-so, citing as support only the unsubstantiated say-so of
earlier Courts going back no farther than the mid-twentieth century.' 95
Scalia then went even further, arguing not only that government may favor
religion in general, but that it also may favor monotheism over other forms of
religion.'9 6 Although he conceded that government may not prefer one sect
over another with respect to financial assistance or free exercise, he asserted
that government is not required to be nondenominational when it comes "to
public acknowledgment of the Creator."' 97 According to Scalia, "[w]ith respect
to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our Na-
tion's historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard
of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disre-
gard of devout atheists."' 98 Justice Thomas joined this dissent.
189 Id. (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)).
190 Id. at 881.
'9' Id. passim (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 886 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193 Id at 886-87.
1'4 Id. at 889 (internal citations omitted).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 893.
197 Id.
198 Id. Justice Kennedy did not join the part of Scalia's dissent that called for abandoning
the neutrality principle. Id. at 885. He did join the part of the dissent that criticized the
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This approach goes even further than Rehnquist's nonpreferentialist stan-
dard. While nonpreferentialism allows government to favor religion over
nonreligion, it does not permit government to discriminate among different re-
ligious sects. The position that Justice Scalia espoused in McCreary, however,
does just that.199 Justice Souter pointed out the extraordinary scope of Scalia's
approach:
iTlhe dissent says that the deity the Framers had in mind was the God of
monotheism, with the consequence that government may espouse a tenet
of traditional monotheism. This is truly a remarkable view. Other Mem-
bers of the Court have dissented on the ground that the Establishment
Clause bars nothing more than governmental preference for one religion
over another, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S., at 98-99, 105 S.Ct. 2479
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), but at least religion has previously been treated
inclusively. Today's dissent, however, apparently means that government
should be free to approve the core beliefs of a favored religion over the
tenets of others, a view that should trouble anyone who prizes religious
liberty.2 ° °
III. JUSTICE KENNEDY AS A POTENTIAL ROADBLOCK
TO NONPREFERENTIALISM
Justice Kennedy likely will be the decisive vote in determining if the Court
embraces nonpreferentialism or maintains some form of neutrality standard. In
County of Allegheny, he expressed disagreement with the neutrality principle
and sharply criticized it. 20 In addition, his coercion standard is consistent with
Rehnquist's nonpreferentialist standard because it permits government to favor
religion over nonreligion, so long as government stops short of establishing a
state religion or coercing participation in religion.2 °2
majority's interpretation of Lemon and argued that the displays were constitutional under
Lemon. Id.
199 See Esenberg, supra note 37, at 15 (calling Scalia's McCreary County dissent one of
the clearest expressions of nonpreferentialism).
200 McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 879-80. See also Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional
Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Es-
tablishment Clause, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2006) (Scalia's dissent "may represent
the beginnings of a revolution in Establishment Clause jurisprudence[.]"); Esenberg, supra
note 37, at 10 (Scalia's dissent argues "that government is free to endorse .... monotheistic
religion.").
201 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 656-59 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
202 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessing Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 1331, 1354 & n.142 (citing Kennedy's County of Allegheny opinion as consistent
with Rehnquist's view of nonpreferentialism); Smith, supra note 20, at 268 (stating that
Kennedy shares Rehnquist's nonpreferentialist view). Cf also, e.g., Esenberg, supra note
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Despite this alignment with Rehnquist, however, Justice Kennedy's concerns
about coercive pressures on students in public schools could block the Court's
adoption of nonpreferentialism. In his opinion in Lee v. Weisman, Kennedy
emphasized that "there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of
conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary pub-
lic schools. 2 °3 Noting that "prayer exercises in public schools carry a particu-
lar risk of indirect coercion[,]" he explained that "[w]hat to most believers may
seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their
religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dis-
senter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a relig-
ious orthodoxy. 2 °4 He also called the classroom a place where "the risk of
compulsion is especially high. 20 5 Two facts were critical to his conclusion
that the graduation prayers in Lee coerced students to participate in a religious
exercise: state officials directed the performance of the prayers, and students
were "in a fair and real sense" obligated to attend the graduation ceremonies
and participate in the prayers.206
It is unknown, however, whether Kennedy's concern about coercion is limit-
ed to students' compelled participation in traditional religious exercises, such
as prayer, or whether it includes students' exposure to a religious theory on the
origins of life, among other theories, as part of a science curriculum. Justice
Kennedy has expressed his views regarding coercion and students in one other
case, Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.2 °7
Mergens involved a constitutional challenge to the federal Equal Access Act,
which mandates that public secondary schools that maintain a "limited open
forum" cannot deny equal access based on the nature of students' speech to
students who wish to meet within the forum.20 8 The Court held that the Act
prohibited a school district from denying a student religious club permission to
meet on school premises and that this interpretation of the Act did not violate
the Establishment Clause.20 9
37, at 56 (stating that Kennedy does not have a separationist view of the Establishment
Clause).
203 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992); see also Gey, supra note 3, at 3 (noting
that Kennedy "continues to be troubled by the persistence of religious coercion of stu-
dents.").
204 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
205 Id. at 596.
206 Id. at 586. Though attendance at the ceremony was not a graduation requirement, the
majority held that the state could not put objecting students to the choice of skipping their
graduation, attending and protesting the prayers, or attending and participating in the
prayers. Id. at 593.
207 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
208 Id. at 233 (quoting Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1984)).
209 Id. at 247, 253. The club's purposes were "to permit the students to read and discuss
the Bible, to have fellowship, and to pray together." Id. at 232.
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Writing separately, Justice Kennedy agreed that the Act did not violate the
Establishment Clause because it did not have a coercive effect on students. El0
According to Kennedy, "[tihe inquiry with respect to coercion must be whether
the government imposes pressure upon a student to participate in a religious
activity. ' '2 1 Kennedy found that the Act's mandate of equal access for the
religious club was not coercive because the Act did not authorize school au-
thorities to require students to attend the club meetings, the meetings occurred
outside of school hours, and the Act did not compel school employees to par-
ticipate in club activities. lL
Justice Kennedy's opinions in Mergens and Lee indicate that his concerns
about coercion of students focus on compelled participation in formal religious
exercises, such as prayer and worship. Both of those cases involved student
participation in prayer. Providing instruction on intelligent design as one of
several theories on the origin of life does not compel students to participate in a
religious exercise, nor does it require them to affirm a particular belief. Thus,
if Justice Kennedy's concerns are limited to coerced student participation in
traditional religious exercises, then he likely will not object to a nonpreferen-
tialist standard that would permit the teaching of intelligent design as an alter-
native to evolution.2 13
IV. ROBERTS' AND ALITO'S RECORDS ON ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ISSUES
After Van Orden and McCreary, the neutrality principle first announced in
Everson hangs by a thread. The divergent views expressed in the Court's most
recent cases, especially McCreary, demonstrate that its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is at a critical point. Four justices-Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer-continue to support the neutrality principle.2 4 Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy, however, appear ready to jettison neutrality and adopt
nonpreferentialism, at least in certain circumstances. That puts the newest
members of the Court-Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito-in the posi-
tion to cast the deciding votes. As Professor Chemerinsky has predicted, "[i]f
the two new Justices-John Roberts and Samuel Alito-take the Rehnquist
[nonpreferentialist] approach, there will be five votes to overrule the Lemon
test and bring about the dramatic change long sought by Rehnquist.
215
210 Id. at 260-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
211 Id. at 261.
212 Id. at 260-61.
213 But cf, e.g., Newman, supra note 3, at 50 (predicting that Kennedy would find an
Establishment Clause violation if a school attempted to convey a religious doctrine in the
classroom).
214 Justice Breyer's support is questionable, given his criticism of neutrality in Van Ord-
en.
215 Chemerinsky, supra note 172, at 1355.
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A. Chief Justice Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts does not have an extensive written record reflecting his
views on the Establishment Clause. Prior to his appointment as Chief Justice,
he had served on the bench for only two years, as a member of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. During that tenure, he did not decide any cases
addressing the Establishment Clause. Nonetheless, his prior work as an Asso-
ciate White House Counsel, as Principal Deputy Solicitor General at the Justice
Department, and as an attorney in private practice shed light on his views.
1. The White House Memoranda
From 1982 to 1986, Roberts served as an Associate Counsel to President
Reagan in the White House Counsel's Office.2 16 In that capacity, he wrote
several memos to White House Counsel Fred Fielding that illuminate his views
on the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
One such memo is Roberts' June 4, 1985 analysis of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, which the Court had issued earlier that day.
Roberts, a former Rehnquist law clerk, summarized the ruling and the positions
expressed in the various opinions. He pointed out that, in dissent, Justice Rehn-
quist had "called for abandoning the Lemon test, arguing from historical analy-
sis that the Establishment Clause prohibited only establishing a state religion or
preferring one denomination or sect at the expense of others. 21 7
Then, tellingly, Roberts offered the following personal assessment of the de-
cision:
For what it's worth, a reading of the opinions strongly suggests that the
outcome of this case shifted in the writing. As I see it, Rehnquist was
writing for the Court-he would not write 24 pages of dissent (longer
even than Stevens's majority), and the structure and tone of the dissent is
that of a majority opinion. He had five votes to uphold the statute, and
tried to use the occasion to go after the bigger game of the Lemon test
itself. O'Connor probably was in Rehnquist's original majority but was
not convinced that the broad opinion applied to the facts, penning a dissent
to the would-be majority-her 19-page concurrence is directed solely to
that opinion, critiquing it step-by-step and analyzing none of the others. It
is very unusual for a concurrence to take on a dissent in such a fashion,
and at such length. O'Connor's dissent apparently persuaded Powell to
drop by the wayside as well, with a lame concurring opinion focusing on
stare decisis, as if to explain why he was changing a vote. Thus, as I see
it, Rehnquist took a tenuous five-person majority and tried to revolutionize
216 The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographies
current.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
217 Memorandum from John Roberts, Jr., The White House to Fred Fielding (June 4,
1985) (on file with author).
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and ended up losing the majority.
Which is not to say the effort was misguided. In the larger scheme of
things what is important is not whether this law is upheld or struck down,
but what test is applied.2 18
Of course, the "revolution" that Rehnquist attempted in Wallace was the
adoption of nonpreferentialism as the governing standard for the Establishment
Clause. As Roberts noted, Rehnquist had argued that the Establishment Clause
permits government to favor religion in general, so long as it does not establish
a national religion or discriminate among religious sects.21 9 Roberts' memo
indicates his support for this position and the doctrinal shift that Rehnquist tried
to accomplish.22 °
Two months later, Roberts wrote a memo to Fielding commenting on a
speech to be given by then-Secretary of Education William Bennett.221 In the
draft of the speech that Roberts reviewed, Bennett stated that a "new aversion
to religion" had arisen and that the Constitution had become, "in the hands of
aggressive plaintiffs and beguiled judges, the instrument for nothing less than a
kind of ghettoizing of religion. '2 2 He criticized the neutrality principle, assert-
ing that "neutrality to religion turned out to bring with it a neutrality to those
values that issue from religion. '223 Finally, Bennett called the reasoning of
recent Supreme Court decisions unsound and asserted that the Court had
"launched an interpretation under which the First Amendment forbids precisely
what many a man in the First Congress went to such pains to protect-namely,
public support of religion, albeit on a nondiscriminatory basis. 224
218 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
219 For Rehnquist's argument, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
220 See PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, FINAL PRE-HEARING REPORT IN OPPOSITION TO
THE CONFIRMATION OF JOHN ROBERTS TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 82-84
(2005), http://media.pfaw.org/stc/PH-report.pdf (citing Roberts' Wallace memorandum as
evidence that he interprets Establishment Clause to allow government favoritism of relig-
ion); see also Jay A. Sekulow and Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten
Commandments: Compounding the Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 33, 50 (2005-2006) (calling Roberts "a judge with a constitutional philosophy similar
to that of his mentor, the late Chief Justice[.]").
221 Memorandum from John Roberts, Jr., The White House, to Fred Fielding (Aug. 6,
1985) (on file with author).
222 William J. Bennett, U.S. Sec'y of Educ., Address to the Knights of Columbus Su-
preme Council Meeting 4 (Aug. 7, 1985) (on file with author).
223 Id.
224 Id. at 9 (quoting WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMER-
ICAN DEMOCRACY 60, Basic Books, Inc. 1976)). Walter Berns is professor emeritus at Ge-
orgetown University and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research. See Walter Berns-Biography, http://www.aei.org/scholars/scholarID.4/
scholar.asp.
[Vol. 18:67
SHIFTING OUT OF NEUTRAL
Roberts summarized the speech's central point as an argument that the Su-
preme Court's recent Establishment Clause decisions "betray a hostility to re-
ligion not demanded by the Constitution. "225 Although Roberts predicted that
Bennett's remarks would "stir up the debate," he saw "no purely legal reason to
object to them., 226 Indeed, he stated that he had "no quarrel with Bennett on
the merits. 227 By agreeing with Bennett's view that the Establishment Clause
permits public support of religion on a nondiscriminatory basis, Roberts again
espoused his support for nonpreferentialism.
Finally, Roberts also indicated his support for favoring religion over nonreli-
gion in a November 21, 1985 memo that he wrote regarding a Senate Joint
Resolution.22 8 In the wake of Wallace v. Jaffree, the Senate passed a resolution
proposing a constitutional amendment to overturn the decision and permit "in-
dividual or group silent prayer or reflection in public schools. 2 29 In a memo
regarding the resolution, Roberts wrote that he did not object to the Justice
Department supporting it.230 According to Roberts, such support was appropri-
ate because "the conclusion in Jaffree v. Wallace that the Constitution prohibits
such a moment of silent reflection-or even silent 'prayer' seems indefen-
sible. 231
2. The Solicitor General's Arguments in Lee v. Weisman
Roberts served as Principal Deputy Solicitor General in the Justice Depart-
ment from 1989 to 1993.232 During that time, Lee v. Weisman made its way to
the Supreme Court.233 Represented by the Solicitor General, the United States
submitted amicus briefs supporting the school defendants' petition for certiora-
ri and their merits brief after the Supreme Court took the case. 2 3' Deputy So-
225 Memorandum from John Roberts, Jr., The White House, to Fred Fielding (Aug. 6,
1985) (on file with author).
226 Id.
227 Id. See FINAL PRE-HEARING REPORT IN OPPOSITION TO THE CONFIRMATION OF JOHN
ROBERTS, supra note 220, at 85-88 (citing Roberts' memorandum regarding the Bennett
speech as proof of support for government favoritism of religion).
228 Memorandum from John Roberts, Jr., The White House, to Fred Fielding (Nov. 21,
1985) (on file with author).
229 Id. (quoting S.J. Res. 2 - Constitutional Amendment to Permit Silent Prayer in
Schools).
230 Id.
231 Id. See also FINAL PRE-HEARING REPORT IN OPPOSITION TO THE CONFIRMATION OF
JOHN ROBERTS, supra note 220, at 85 (citing memorandum regarding Senate Resolution as
proof that Roberts favors government support for religion).
232 The Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 216.
233 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
234 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014), 1991 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 308; Brief for the United
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licitor General Roberts signed on to both amicus briefs.235
The amicus brief at the certiorari stage urged the Supreme Court to hear the
case and use it as an opportunity to "jettison the framework erected by Lemon's
tripartite analysis in circumstances where, as here, the practice under assault is
a non-coercive, ceremonial acknowledgement of heritage of a deeply religious
people. ' 36 The Solicitor General argued that the Court should replace Lemon
with "a single, careful inquiry into whether the practice at issue provides direct
benefits to a religion in a manner that threatens the establishment of an official
church or compels persons to participate in a religion or religious exercise con-
trary to their consciences." '37
The Solicitor General expanded this argument at the merits stage, asserting
that the case offered the Court
the opportunity to replace the Lemon test with the more general principle
implicit in the traditions relied upon in Marsh and explicit in the history of
the Establishment Clause. That principle focuses on the overriding con-
cern of the Religion Clauses-the assurance of religious liberty-and
holds that civic acknowledgments of religion in public life do not offend
the Establishment Clause, as long as they neither threaten the establish-
ment of an official religion nor coerce participation in religious activi-
ties.
23 8
According to the Solicitor General, the graduation prayers in Lee did not
violate this principle because they neither established a state religion nor co-
erced participation in religious exercises.239 The Solicitor General dismissed
concerns about the prayers' coercive effect, declaring that the "Framers' ac-
ceptance of ceremonial acknowledgements presupposed some minimal degree
of individual tolerance" for public acknowledgments of religion that might of-
fend some people. 4°
This view of the Establishment Clause is consistent with the tenets of non-
preferentialism. 241' Both views assert that the Establishment Clause permits
States as Amicus Curiae, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014), 1991 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs Lexis 264.
235 Id. at *308. Id. at *264.
236 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 234, at * 13.
237 Id. at *24.
238 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 234,
at *12.
239 Id. at *42.
240 Id. at *39. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the Solicitor General's argument
that the voluntary nature of the graduation ceremony obviated any coercive effect, calling it
"formalistic in the extreme" to claim that "a teenage student has a real choice not to attend
her high school graduation." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992).
241 See, e.g., Garry, supra note 8, at 40 (asserting that under nonpreferentialist doctrine,
"all nonpreferential accommodations, whether mandatory or voluntary, are constitutional,
unless they have a coercive effect on someone else's religious exercise."); see also FINAI.
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government to favor religion over nonreligion, so long as it does not create a
state religion. Roberts' position, however, goes further, asserting that the only
other limit that the Establishment Clause places on government is to prohibit
coerced participation in religious activities. Nonpreferentialism at least prohib-
its government from favoring one religious sect over another, which Roberts's
position in Lee does not.
242
3. Positions Advocated While in Private Practice
From 1993 to 2003, Roberts practiced law in Washington, D.C. In Ehlers-
Renzi v. Connelly School of the Holy Child, Inc., Roberts represented a Catho-
lic school that sought to claim a zoning exemption available only to private
schools located on property held by religious organizations.243 The exemption
relieved such schools from having to obtain a "special exception" before build-
ing certain structures. 244 After the county granted Roberts' client the exemp-
tion, neighboring landowners challenged the grant as an Establishment Clause
violation. 45
In their brief to the Fourth Circuit, Roberts and co-counsel conceded that the
exemption indirectly aided religious organizations, but they argued that such
aid was a permissible exercise of the government's authority to accommodate
religion. 2 46 They added that "efforts to accommodate religion are invariably
constitutional when the State simply chooses to relieve religious institutions of
burdens placed on secular elements of society or society at large. '247 Although
Roberts was representing a client, it is noteworthy that he argued that govern-
ment may confer a special status on religion and prefer it over nonreligion.
Roberts argued the case himself and prevailed, as the court reversed the district
court and upheld the exemption.248
PRE-HEARING REPORT IN OPPOSITION TO THE CONFIRMATION OF JOHN ROBERTS, supra note
189, at 89-91 (citing Roberts' arguments in Lee as evidence of his hostility to principle of
government neutrality toward religion).
242 In light of Roberts' high-level position, it is appropriate to conclude that these argu-
ments reflect his personal views. According to Professor Susan Carle, who worked with
Roberts at the Justice Department, he "held a political appointment of great power" and the
briefs on which his name appeared "reflect his considered and thoughtful use of that power."
Susan D. Carle, What Roberts Argued, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, No. 31.
243 Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, Inc., 224 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2000).
244 Id.
245 Id. at 284-85.
246 Brief of Appellant at 16, 28, Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child. Inc.,
224 F.3d 283 (No. 99-2352), 2000 WYL 33982797 at *16, *28
247 Id. at 16. See FINAL PRE-HEARING REPORT IN OPPOSITION TO THE CONFIRMATION OF
JOHN ROBERTS, supra note 220, at 91-93 (citing Roberts' advocacy in Ehlers-Renzi as evi-
dence of his support for government favoritism of religion).
248 Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 292. One judge dissented, stating that the zoning exemp-
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B. Justice Alito
Unlike Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito's judicial record provides insight
into his Establishment Clause views. Prior to his Supreme Court appointment,
Justice Alito served for fifteen years on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit249 and participated in several cases involving the Religion Clauses. He
also has addressed an Establishment Clause challenge since joining the Su-
preme Court. His record indicates that he has a narrow view of the Establish-
ment Clause and favors government support for religion. °
1. Third Circuit Record on Establishment Clause Issues
While on the Third Circuit, Alito participated in three cases in which rights
of religious expression were pitted against school concerns that permitting such
speech would violate the Establishment Clause. Judge Alito consistently took
the position that the right of religious expression is superior to Establishment
Clause concerns.
In American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Re-
gional Board of Education, students challenged a policy allowing student-led
prayer at their high school graduation. 1 Under the policy, the senior class was
allowed to vote on whether it wanted "prayer, a moment of reflection, or noth-
ing at all" at the ceremony.252 The case arose after Lee v. Weisman but before
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe. Following Lee, a majority of the
Third Circuit en banc ruled the policy unconstitutional because the prayer had a
coercive effect and state officials had a significant degree of control over the
prayer.253
Judge Alito, however, joined a dissenting opinion 4.25  The dissent argued that
the Establishment Clause should "serve the free exercise of religion" and
"should not be read to prohibit activity which the Free Exercise Clause pro-
tects., 255 Remarkably, the dissenting judges declared that the policy did not
even implicate the Establishment Clause because "none of the decisions made
by the graduating class concerning graduation prayer can be attributed to the
tion "looks very much like ordinary favoritism for religious property owners." Id. at 293
(Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
249 The Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 216.
250 See PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, THE RECORD AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF SA-
MUEL ALITO: "No ONE TO THE RIGHT OF SAM ALITO ON THIS COURT" 119-31 (2006), http://
media.pfaw.org/stc/alito-final.pdf (discussing Alito's judicial and pre-judicial records as evi-
dence of his support for government favoritism of religion and his opposition to government
neutrality).
251 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996).
252 Id. at 1475.
253 Id. at 1478-81.
254 Id. at 1489 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
255 Id.
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state.-256 Most significantly, the dissent expressly endorsed one of the basic
tenets of nonpreferentialism, asserting that the "First Amendment does not con-
demn legislation or official policy that has the effect of assisting religion gener-
ally; the First Amendment itself gives religion an exceptionally protected sta-
tus.
''25 7 Judge Alito joined all of these views.
Judge Alito dissented for similar reasons in C.H. v. Oliva.25 8 In that case, the
mother of a kindergartener sued school officials after they removed a poster the
student had drawn of Jesus from a display of his class's work.259 The students
had made the posters as part of an assignment to draw something that they were
"thankful for."260 A majority of the Third Circuit held that the complaint did
not allege facts sufficient to prove liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.261
Judge Alito dissented, arguing that the complaint was adequate.262 Address-
ing the case's merits, he stated that he
would hold that discriminatory treatment of the poster because of its "re-
ligious theme" would violate the First Amendment. Specifically, I would
hold that public school students have the right to express religious views
in class discussion or in assigned work, provided that their expression falls
within the scope of the discussion or the assignment and provided that the
school's restriction on expression does not satisfy strict scrutiny.263
Alito rejected the school officials' argument that avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation was a compelling interest for removing the poster, stating that
a reasonable observer would not have viewed the exhibition of the poster "as an
effort by the school to endorse religion in general or Christianity in particu-
lar. ,,264
In another case involving religious speech at school, Judge Alito again held
that religious expression takes precedence over Establishment Clause concerns.
In Child Evangelism Fellowship of New Jersey, Inc. v. Stafford Township
256 Id. at 1490.
257 American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d
1471, 1496 (3d Cir. 1996) (Mansmann, J., dissenting). See also, THE RECORD AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL AUTO, supra note 250, at 122-23 (discussing Alito's agreement
with Black Horse Pike dissenting opinion).
258 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Hood v. Medford Twp Bd. of
Educ., 533 U.S. 915 (2001).
259 Oliva, 226 F.3d at 201. The student's poster was later returned to the display, but it
was placed in "a less prominent location" at the end of the hall. Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 202-03.
262 Id. at 206. (Alito, J., dissenting). Judge Alito said the majority based its decision on
"a spurious procedural ground never raised by the defendants[.]" Id. at 203.
263 Id. at 210. See also, THE RECORD AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL ALITO, supra
note 250, at 130-32 (discussing Alito's Oliva dissent).
264 Id. at 213.
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265School Dist., an organization with the stated purpose of "evangeliz[ing] boys
and girls with the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ" sought permission to dis-
tribute flyers about its activities at schools and at "Back to School" nights.266
When the school district rejected the request, the organization sued.
Judge Alito upheld an injunction issued in favor of the religious organiza-
tion.267 He held that the school district had committed viewpoint discrimina-
tion by denying the religious group's request to distribute information, while
permitting other groups, such as the PTA and the Girl Scouts, to engage in
those activities. 268 As he had done in Oliva, Judge Alito rejected the school
district's argument that its action was necessary to prevent an Establishment
Clause violation. 69 Despite the religious group's avowed purpose of evangel-
izing children, Judge Alito declared that granting it equal access "would not
have the principal or primary effect of advancing religion. Rather, the principal
and primary effect would be to inform school families about available commu-
nity activities and to foster a wide range of activities in the community. "270
2. Decisions Limiting Standing to Raise Establishment Clause
Challenges
Justice Alito also has favored government support for religion by limiting
who may sue to challenge government actions that aid religion. He wrote the
majority opinion in ACLU of New Jersey v. Township of Wall, in which the
Third Circuit held that two township residents lacked standing to challenge its
exhibition of a holiday display.271 Alito found that the residents had no stand-
ing either as municipal taxpayers or as victims of non-economic injuries."'
Despite the township's ownership of the creche and menorah used in the dis-
play and its "support, direction, and/or approval" of the display's exhibition,
Alito held that the plaintiffs lacked taxpayer standing.273 He also held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing based on non-economic injuries because their com-
plaint referred to injuries arising from an earlier display that the township had
erected, rather than a modified display used after the plaintiffs sued.274 Al-
265 386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2004).
266 Id. at 521-23.
267 Id. at 535-36.
268 Id. at 526-30.
269 Id. at 530-35. See also, THE RECORD AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL ALTO,
supra note 250, at 128-29 (discussing Alito's Child Evangelism opinion).
270 Child Evangelism Fellowship, 386 F. 3d at 534.
271 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.J. v. Twp. Of Wall, 246 F.3d 258, 260 (3d Cir. 2001).
272 Id. at 262.
273 Id. at 263-64.
274 Id. at 264-66. The first display included "a crche with traditional figures, a lighted
evergreen tree, two decorated urns that are part of the complex, and four snowman banners
attached to light posts at the complex." Id. at 260. While the case was pending, the town-
ship erected a modified display that included a creche, "a donated menorah, candy cane
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though the plaintiffs alleged several specific non-economic injuries arising
from their reaction to the initial display, 75 Judge Alito stated that "[w]hile we
assume that the [plaintiffs] disagreed with the [modified] display for some rea-
son, we cannot assume that the [plaintiffs] suffered the type of injury that
would confer standing. 2 76
Justice Alito has continued to take this narrow view of standing after his
appointment to the Supreme Court. In Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foun-
277 nio~naddation, Inc., an organization and its members sued the director of the White
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, alleging that the of-
fice had violated the Establishment Clause by conducting conferences where
faith-based organizations were "singled out as being particularly worthy of fed-
eral funding" and "the belief in God is extolled as distinguishing the claimed
effectiveness of faith-based social services. '278 The plaintiffs asserted that the
conferences also promoted religious groups over secular ones. 279 They alleged
standing as federal taxpayers.2 8 0
In a fractured decision, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.28
Justice Alito wrote the plurality opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tice Kennedy joined.282 Alito rejected a broad reading of Flast v. Cohen, which
had held that taxpayers have standing to challenge expenditures of federal
funds as an Establishment Clause violation. 28 3 Alito limited Flast to its specific
facts, holding that the Hein plaintiffs lacked standing because they had chal-
lenged discretionary executive branch expenditures of general appropriations,
rather than expenditures by Congress under its taxing and spending power.2 84
Alito conceded the plaintiffs' contention that limiting Flast to congressional
expenditures would permit an executive agency to use its discretionary funds
"to build a house of worship or to hire clergy of one denomination and send
them out to spread their faith. '2 85 He nonetheless dismissed concerns about
such a "parade of horribles," stating that "none of these things has happened,"
and that "[i]n the unlikely event that any of these executive actions did take
banners rather than the less prominent snowman banners, a larger evergreen tree, and two
signs .... " Id.
275 Id. at 264-65.
276 Id. at 266. See also, THE RECORD AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL ALITO, supra
note 250, at 126-27 (discussing Alito's Wall opinion as evidence of his narrow view of
Establishment Clause).
277 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc.,127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
278 Id. at 2560.
279 Id. at 2561.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 2558.
282 Id. at 2258.
283 See id. at 2565-68; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106-06 (1968).
284 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2566-68.
285 Id. at 2571.
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place, Congress could quickly step in."286
3. Disagreement With Establishment Clause Precedent
Justice Alito also has expressed disagreement with the Supreme Court's Es-
tablishment Clause precedents. In 1985, Alito applied for the position of Depu-
ty Assistant Attorney General at the Justice Department. Applicants were
asked to "provide any information that you regard as pertinent to your philo-
sophical commitment to the policies of this administration, or would show that
you are qualified to effectively fill a position involved in the development,
advocacy, and vigorous implementation of those policies." '287 Alito's response
included the following statement: "In college, I developed a deep interest in
constitutional law, motivated in large part by disagreement with Warren Court
decisions, particularly in the areas of criminal procedure, the Establishment
Clause, and reapportionment. '18' Notably, Engel v. Vitale, School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, and Epperson v. Arkansas were Warren Court
decisions.289
Alito reiterated his disagreement with Establishment Clause precedent during
the confirmation process for his Supreme Court appointment. Senator Robert
Byrd reported that, during a private meeting with Alito prior to the confirma-
tion hearings, Alito expressed his belief that the Supreme Court "had erred by
going too far in prohibiting government support for religion at the risk of ham-
pering individual expression of religion. 29 °
These prior statements and writings demonstrate that Justice Alito and Chief
Justice Roberts have taken positions consistent with the tenets of nonpreferen-
tialism. In particular, both have expressed agreement with the notion that the
Establishment Clause accords religion a special status and permits government
support for religion on a nondiscriminatory basis. Indeed, Roberts has express-
ly endorsed Rehnquist's nonpreferentialist standard.2 91 Thus, Roberts and Alito
appear poised to align themselves with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy if
the Court has an opportunity to reconsider its Establishment Clause jurispru-
286 Id.
287 White House PPO Non-Career Appointment Form, Nov. 18, 1985 (on file with au-
thor).
288 Id. See also THE RECORD AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL ALITO, supra note
250, at 120 (discussing statements in Alito's job application as evidence of his opposition to
neutrality principle).
289 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
290 David D. Kirkpatrick, Nominee Is Said to Question Church-State Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A22. See also THE RECORD AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL
ALITO, supra note 250, at 121 (discussing Alito's statements to senators during confirmation
process).
291 See supra Section IV.A.1 and notes 217-19,
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dence.292 As discussed below, the debate over teaching intelligent design in
public schools could provide that opportunity.
V. THE INTELLIGENT DESIGN DEBATE As THE ROAD
To NONPREFERENTIALISM
A. What Is Intelligent Design?
Intelligent Design (also known as "ID") is a theory about the origins of life
that is presented as an alternative to evolution. The fundamental premise of
intelligent design is
that purely natural forces cannot adequately explain the origin and devel-
opment of living organisms. Intelligent design thus attributes the origin of
life to the actions of an intelligent agent, positing that if evolution oc-
curred at all, it was not by the process of natural selection, but by the work
of an omniscient Creator.293
Intelligent design permits the possibility of supernatural causation, but it
"does not attempt to address religious questions about the identity or metaphys-
ical nature of the designer.
' 2 94
According to proponents of the theory, there are two indicators of intelligent
design: specified complexity and irreducible complexity.295 The concept of
"specified complexity," proposed by mathematician William Dembski, holds
that "systems or sequences that have the joint properties of 'high complexity'
(or low probability) and 'specification' invariably result from intelligent causes,
not chance or physical-chemical laws. ' 296 Dembski also claims to have created
292 According to Professor Gey, the basic principle of separationism no longer
[d]efines the field for most of the mainstream players in this area of constitutional law.
, The debate today is not over how aggressively to pursue the central value repre-
sented by the separation of church and state. Rather, the debate today is over whether
we should abandon the goal of separation altogether.
Gey, supra note 9, at 783-84.
293 Stephanie L. Shemin, The Potential Constitutionality of Intelligent Design?, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 621, 628-29 (2005). See also Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Relig-
ious Establishment, and the Challenge of Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmics &
PUB. POL'Y 461, 462 (2003) (intelligent design posits that "intelligent agency, as an aspect of
scientific theory-making, has more explanatory power in accounting for the specified, and
sometimes irreducible, complexity of some physical systems, including biological entities,
and/or the existence of the universe as a whole, than the blind forces of unguided and
everlasting matter.").
294 David K. DeWolf, John G. West, & Casey Luskin, Intelligent Design Will Survive
Kitzmiller v. Dover, 68 MONT. L. REv. 7, 28-29 (2007). See also Frances Beckwith, Science
and Religion Twenty Years After McLean v. Arkansas: Evolution, Public Education, and the
New Challenge of Intelligent Design, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 455 (2003) (explaining
basic principles of intelligent design).
295 Beckwith, supra note 293, at 470-75.
296 David K. DeWolf, Stephen C. Meyer, & Mark Edward DeForrest, Teaching the Ori-
20081
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL
an "explanatory filter" that scientists can use to distinguish among chance, ne-
cessity, and design as explanations for events.297 The concept of "irreducible
complexity," which Professor Michael Behe developed, posits that there "are
certain biochemical structures, that, being 'irreducibly complex,' could not
have arisen through unguided natural processes. ' 29 8 Behe cites the "acid-pow-
ered rotary engines that turn the whiplike flagella of certain bacteria" as an
irreducibly complex system.299 These structures are irreducibly complex be-
cause "[t]he absence of any one of [their parts] would result in the complete
loss of motor function. 3 °°
B. The First Test of Intelligent Design: Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School
District
30 1
In 2004, a school district in Dover, Pennsylvania enacted a policy mandating
an introduction to the theory of intelligent design in high school biology clas-
ses. The local school board first passed the following resolution: "Students will
be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin's theory and of other theories of
evolution including, but not limited to, intelligent design. Note: Origins of Life
is not taught."30 2 The school board later announced that, beginning in January
2005, teachers would be required to read the following statement to students in
the ninth grade biology class at Dover High School:
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about
Darwin's Theory of Evolution and eventually to take a standardized test of
which evolution is a part.
Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new
evidence is discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist
for which there is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested expla-
nation that unifies a broad range of observations.
Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from
Darwin's view. The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available
gins Controversy: Science, or Religion, or Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 39, 60 (2000) (foot-
note omitted). See also Beckwith, supra note 251, at 470-74 (explaining concept of speci-
fied complexity).
297 DeWolf, supra note 296, at 61.
298 Shemin, supra note 293, at 630-31. Numerous scientists assert that intelligent design
is not a valid scientific theory because it is not testable by recognized scientific methods.
For a comprehensive critique of the scientific deficiencies of intelligent design, see Matthew
J. Brauer, Barbara Forrest, and Stephen G. Gey, Is It Science Yet?: Intelligent Design, Crea-
tionism, and the Constitution, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2005).
299 DeWolf, supra note 296, at 62.
300 Id.
30 400 F.Supp.2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
302 Id. at 708.
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for students who might be interested in gaining an understanding of what
Intelligent Design actually involves.
With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open mind.
The school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to individual stu-
dents and their families. As a Standards-driven district, class instruction
focuses upon preparing students to achieve proficiency on Standards-
based assessments. °3
Several students and parents filed a lawsuit challenging this policy as a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. Thus, a federal court in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania became the first in the nation to decide whether it is constitutional
to teach the theory of intelligent design in public school science classes.3 04
In a comprehensive opinion, Judge John E. Jones III ruled that the policy
violated the Establishment Clause for several reasons. Applying the endorse-
ment test, he found that an objective observer, whether adult or child, would
easily recognize the religious nature of intelligent design. 3 5 He based that con-
clusion on several factors, including evidence that the argument for intelligent
design can be traced directly to arguments for the existence of God made by
Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century.30 6 Indeed, experts who testified for the
school district admitted that "their personal view is that the designer is God"
and that many leading advocates of ID "believe the designer to be God. 30 7
Based on evidence such as this, and other voluminous evidence of the history
and development of ID, Judge Jones concluded that ID is not a scientific theory
and is "nothing less than the progeny of creationism. '30 8 Accordingly, he ruled
that an objective student would view the ID policy as a strong endorsement of
religion.30 9
Judge Jones then analyzed the policy under Lemon. Citing McCreary Coun-
ty, he stated that "the central inquiry is whether the District has shown favorit-
ism toward religion generally or any set of religious beliefs in particular."3 '
Applying this standard, which relies on the neutrality principle, he found that
the "disclaimer's plain language, the legislative history, and the historical con-
text in which the ID Policy arose, all inevitably lead to the conclusion that the
Defendants consciously chose to change Dover's biology curriculum to ad-
vance religion."3 1 Based on these findings, Judge Jones held that there was a
303 Id. at 708-09.
304 Id. at 708.
305 Id. at 718.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id. at 720-21.
309 Id. at 724.
310 Id. at 746. This question would not be the central inquiry under a nonpreferentialist
standard. See Section V.C, infra.
311 Kitzmiller. 400 F.Supp.2d at 747.
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"blatantly religious purpose behind the ID Policy." 312 He rejected the school
district's asserted secular purpose-improving science education and encourag-
ing students to exercise critical thinking skills-as a sham, calling it "ludi-
crous" to assert the existence of a secular purpose in light of the evidence
showing the origin and development of the ID Policy.313 With respect to the
effects of the ID policy, he concluded that since ID is not science, "the conclu-
sion is inescapable that the only real effect of the ID policy is the advancement
of religion. 314
C. The Use of An Intelligent Design Case To Adopt Nonpreferentialism
Despite Kitzmiller, the debate over teaching intelligent design is far from
over. Richard Thompson of the Thomas More Law Center, which represented
the Dover school board, stated that "[r]egardless of the opinion, the issue of
intelligent design will go forward. ' 3 15 Several scholars agree. Shortly after
Kitzmiller, Professor David DeWolf, a leading ID proponent, criticized the de-
cision and declared that "announcements of the demise of ID were greatly ex-
aggerated. 316 Professor Jay Wexler disagrees with DeWolf on the legality of
teaching ID, but he agrees that the issue is far from resolved, stating that Kitz-
miller "is not likely to be the last word on the constitutionality of ID. 3 17
Kitzmiller will not be the last word because the controversy over intelligent
design extends far beyond Dover, Pennsylvania. According to the National
Center for Science Education, there has been "political activity at the school
district or state level pertaining to teaching evolution in 40 states since
2001 . 3 For example, after eliminating and then reinstating standards requir-
ing schools to teach evolution, the Kansas State Board of Education "approved
changes that allow criticism of evolution but do not promote or prohibit teach-
312 Id. at 756.
313 Id. at 762-63.
314 Id. at 764.
315 Martha Raffaele, Dover Community Split By 'Intelligent Design' Debate, Court's De-
cision, CENTRE DAILY TIMES, Dec. 27, 2005, at B 1. Richard Thompson is the President and
Chief Counsel of the Thomas More Law Center, which describes itself as "a not-for-profit
public interest law firm dedicated to the defense and promotion of the religious freedom of
Christians, time-honored family values, and the sanctity of human life." See Thomas More
Law Center, About Us, http://www.thomasmore.org/qry/page.taf?id=23 (last visited Sept. 29
2008). Its purpose "is to be the sword and shield for people of faith, providing legal repre-
sentation without charge to defend and protect Christians and their religious beliefs in the
public square." Id.
316 DeWolf, supra note 295, at 8.
317 Jay D. Wexler, Intelligent Design and the First Amendment: A Response, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. 63, 63 (2006).
318 McCarthy, supra note 17, at 458, citing, the National Center for Science Education,
News Archive, Sept.25, 2005, http://www.ncseweb.org/pressroom.asp?branch=statement.
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ing ID."31 9 Ohio has adopted "model lesson plans for science education" that
emphasize the purported "controversy" surrounding evolution.3 2° In 2005, "50
local school boards and 14 state legislatures considered proposals to require or
specifically permit public high school science teachers to engage in a critical
teaching of evolution or an affirmative teaching of intelligent design."'32 1 Even
former President George W. Bush entered the fray. During an August 2005
interview, he stated that public schools should teach both evolution and intelli-
gent design "so people can understand what the debate is about.
3 22
Other factors also support the conclusion that the battle over intelligent de-
sign continues and will produce more legal challenges. According to one
scholar,
the politics surrounding anti-evolution efforts have never been more
favorable for a renewed legal assault on the teaching of evolution in the
nation's schools. The roughly twenty year cycle of Supreme Court evolu-
tion cases, the probable dilution by the Roberts Court of the Establishment
Clause as a restraining force on government, the strength of the religious
right in the American political arena, and the addition of two very con-
servative justices to the Court, each suggest that we may see a potent new
challenge to the teaching of this topic reaching the High Court in the near
future.323
319 Id. at 461, citing, the National Center for Science Education, News Archive, Sept.25,
2005, http://www.ncseweb.org/pressroom.asp?branch=statement; Id. at 459.
320 Id. at 461. While the lesson plans do not mandate instruction on intelligent design,
they rely heavily on a book written by a leading ID proponent. Id. Other states have man-
dated the use of disclaimers in conjunction with instruction on evolution. See Selman v.
Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320, 1324 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (challenging a policy requiring
science textbooks to include sticker stating that evolution "is a theory, not a fact," and that
material on evolution "should be approached with an open mind, studied carefully, and criti-
cally considered"); Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir.
1999) (ruling unconstitutional policy requiring teachers to read disclaimer stating that evolu-
tion was presented "to inform students of the scientific concept and not intended to influence
or dissuade the Biblical version of Creation or any other concept"), cert. denied, 530 U.S.
1251 (2000).
321 Kristi L. Bowman, An Empirical Study of Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent De-
sign Instruction in Public Schools, 36 J. L. & EDUC. 301, 316 (2007); see also id. at 316 &
n. 67 ("evolution advocates perceive the intelligent design battles to be far from over").
322 Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Remarks Roil Debate Over Teaching of Evolution, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at A14; see also Peter Baker and Peter Slevin, Bush Remarks on
"Intelligent Design" Theory Set Off Debate," WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at AO1.
323 Newman, supra note 3, at 2; see also Julie F. Mead, Preston C. Green, & Joseph 0.
Oluwole, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Prayer In School In Light of the Resignation
of Justice O'Connor, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 381, 398-400 (2007) (predicting that Roberts Court
will have chance to rule on constitutionality of curricular choices about religion, including
intelligent design).
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Accepting a case involving issues like those in Kitzmiller will present a clear
opportunity for the Supreme Court to reconsider its Establishment Clause doc-
trine. A case raising an Establishment Clause challenge to a public school's
inclusion of intelligent design in its science curriculum will require the Court to
choose an interpretative standard to follow. Under the Court's current stan-
dards, "[tlhe question for ID, as it is for prayer, should be whether a policy
introducing ID into the classroom constitutes an endorsement of religion." '324
However, if a majority of the Court chooses nonpreferentialism as the gov-
erning standard, that question is irrelevant. The only questions relevant in a
nonpreferentialist analysis are whether the challenged measure establishes a na-
tional religion or discriminates among religious sects. Thus, the purpose under-
lying a school board's decision to teach intelligent design would not matter.
This difference is significant because in Epperson and Edwards-the Court's
only prior decisions addressing public school instruction on the origins of
life-the Court struck down anti-evolution measures for lack of a secular pur-
pose.
Teaching intelligent design in public school science courses as an alternative
to evolution would not violate the Establishment Clause under Rehnquist's
nonpreferentialist standard. It would not constitute the establishment of a na-
tional religion as Rehnquist used that phrase.325 By establishing a national re-
ligion, Rehnquist meant "the designation of any church as a 'national' one," not
government actions that endorse religion in general. 26 Indeed, Rehnquist's
standard expressly permits government to favor religion over nonreligion.327
Thus, even if intelligent design has religious origins or is based on creationism,
teaching the theory in public schools will not constitute an establishment under
the nonpreferentialist doctrine because it does not amount to the designation of
a national church.
A school district's decision to include intelligent design in its science curric-
ulum also would be permissible under a nonpreferentialist standard because it
would not discriminate among religious sects. Several scholars have debated
whether intelligent design is a legitimate scientific theory or is a religious theo-
ry.328 Indeed, this question was the central focus of the district court's inquiry
324 Jay D. Wexler, Kitzmiller and the "Is It Science?" Question, 5 FIRsT AMEND. L. REV.
90, 99 (2006).
325 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
326 Id.. Rehnquist also noted that Justice Story, a recognized constitutional scholar, had
asserted that the First Amendment was designed "to prevent any national ecclesiastical es-
tablishment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national govern-
ment." Id. at 104-05.
327 Id. at 106; see also Section I.C.5, supra.
328 For articles asserting that intelligent design is a religious theory and not a scientific
theory see e.g., Brauer, et al., supra note 298; Anne Marie Lofaso, Does Changing the
Definition of Science Solve the Establishment Clause Problem for Teaching Intelligent De-
sign in the Public Schools? Doing an End-Run Around the Constitution, 4 PIERCE L. REV.
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in Kitzmiller. However, even assuming that intelligent design is a religious
theory, it does not prefer one religion over another. ID does not embrace the
tenets of any particular religious denomination; it merely posits that the uni-
verse and its life forms are the work of an intelligent designer, which could be a
supernatural creator.32 9 The concept of a creator is a central tenet of many
religions and is recognized as one of the defining characteristics of a religious
belief.33° Most of the great world religions provide a "metanarrative," which is
"a grand cosmic and/or historical story accepted by the majority of a society as
expressing its beliefs about origin, destiny, and identity." '331 Thus, intelligent
design does not discriminate among religions; rather, it favors them all by ad-
vancing the shared concept of a creator.332
In assessing how an intelligent design case might alter the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is noteworthy that Justices Scalia and
Thomas recently expressed eagerness for the Court to hear a case involving
instruction on alternative theories to evolution. In 2000, they dissented from
the Court's denial of certiorari in Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education v.
Freiler. 33 3 The issue presented was whether a school district violated the Estab-
lishment Clause by requiring teachers to read the following disclaimer to stu-
dents before beginning a unit of study on evolution:
It is hereby recognized by the Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education, that
the lesson to be presented, regarding the origin of life and matter, is
known as the Scientific Theory of Evolution and should be presented to
219 (2006); Colin McRoberts and Timothy Sandefur, Piercing the Veil of Intelligent Design:
Why Courts Should Beware Creationism's Secular Disguise, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 15
(2005); Theresa Wilson, Evolution, Creation, and Naturally Selecting Intelligent Design Out
of the Public Schools, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 203 (2003). For articles asserting that intelligent
design is a legitimate scientific theory see e.g., Beckwith, supra note 293; Johnny Rex
Buckles, The Constitutionality of the Monkey Wrench: Exploring the Case for Intelligent
Design, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 527 (2006); DeWolf, et al., supra note 295; DeWolf, et al., supra
note 296.
329 Wexler, supra note 15, at 442; Beckwith, supra note 293, at 488-89.
330 E.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591-92 (calling concept "that a supernatural creator was
responsible for the creation of humankind" a "religious belief"); Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp.2d
at 720-21 (same). See also Wexler, supra note 317, at 66 (concept that "world was designed
by an intelligent creator" is "inherently religious").
331 JOHN L. ESPOSITO ET AL., WORLD RELIGIONS TODAY 521, 532 (2d ed. 2006); see also
WORLD RELIGIONS FROM ANCIENT HISTORY TO THE PRESENT 33 (Geoffrey Parrinder ed.,
1971) (noting the recurrence across cultures of a concept of deity "as a creative and recrea-
tive power operating in the food quest, sex, fertility, birth, death and the sequence of the
seasons.").
332 Even if it is asserted that intelligent design's premise of a single designer favors mon-
otheism, Justice Scalia takes the position that the Establishment Clause permits government
to favor monotheism and publicly acknowledge the concept of a single Creator. McCreary
Cty., 545 U.S. at 893-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313 530 U.S. 1251(2000) (cert. denied).
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inform students of the scientific concept and not intended to influence or
dissuade the Biblical version of Creation or any other concept.
It is further recognized by the Board of Education that it is the basic right
and privilege of each student to form his/her own opinion or maintain
beliefs taught by parents on this very important matter of the origin of life
and matter. Students are urged to exercise critical thinking and gather all
information possible and closely examine each alternative toward forming
an opinion.334
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, said he would hear the case "if only
to take the opportunity to inter the Lemon test once [and] for all." '335 Even if
Lemon was the proper test, he argued that the Fifth Circuit had misapplied it
because, "[f]ar from advancing religion, the 'principal or primary effect' of the
disclaimer at issue here is merely to advance freedom of thought." '336 Scalia
criticized the Court's inaction: "We stand by in silence while a deeply divided
Fifth Circuit bars a school district from even suggesting to students that other
theories besides evolution-including, but not limited to, the Biblical theory of
creation-are worthy of their consideration." '337 Thus, Scalia and Thomas
demonstrated their desire for the Court to decide a case involving alternative
theories to evolution and their desire to use such a case to adopt a new Estab-
lishment Clause standard.
In light of expressions such as these, an intelligent design case could easily
be the means by which a majority of the Court could adopt the nonpreferential-
ist doctrine. Justices Scalia and Thomas have espoused support for Rehnquist's
nonpreferentialist standard as well as a broader standard that permits govern-
ment to favor monotheistic religions over polytheism and atheism.33 8 Chief
Justice Roberts has expressly endorsed the Rehnquist nonpreferentialist stan-
dard,339 and Justice Kennedy too has expressed views consistent with that stan-
dard.34 ° Likewise, Justice Alito has taken the position that government may
favor and support religion in general.
34 ' Applying a "narrowest grounds
' 342
334 Id. at 2707. The Fifth Circuit had ruled the disclaimer unconstitutional under Lemon,
holding that its primary effect was "to protect and maintain a particular religious viewpoint,
namely belief in the Biblical version of creation." 185 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 1999).
335 Freiler, 120 S. Ct. at 2708.
336 Id.
337 Id. at 2709. This position is consistent with Justice Scalia's views in his Edwards
dissent. See also Edwards, 482 U.S. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338 E.g., McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 886-93
(2005) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
339 See supra pp. 28-33.
341 See supra pp. 26-28.
341 See supra pp. 33-37.
341 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that when the
Court's decision is fragmented and a majority does not agree on a single rationale for the
result, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
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analysis to the positions of these five justices, the view that they all share is
Rehnquist's notion that the Establishment Clause permits government to favor
religion over nonreligion. Thus, they are likely to adopt a form of nonpreferen-
tialism that, at a minimum, includes that premise.
VI. ADOPTING NONPREFERENTIALISM WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES
BEYOND INTELLIGENT DESIGN
"The consequences of a constitutional regime governed by the nonpreferen-
tialist interpretation of the Establishment Clause would be extensive. The name
of the theory itself indicates that the Establishment Clause would no longer
serve as a bar to the incorporation into law of the majority's religious views." '343
Without the Establishment Clause acting as a check, religious activities and
practices that the Court previously has prohibited in the public schools could
become permissible under a nonpreferentialist standard. The role of religion
and religious practices in the public schools could become more prevalent.
This increased presence can be seen by applying a nonpreferentialist analysis to
four religious practices that the Supreme Court previously has held unconstitu-
tional in public schools: teacher and student-led prayer, release-time for relig-
ious instruction, displays of the Ten Commandments, and Bible readings.
A. Prayer in Public Schools
Under a nonpreferentialist standard, public schools could institute nonde-
nominational teacher and student-led prayer. The Court ruled unconstitutional
the teacher-led prayer in Engel v. Vitale because it was plainly a religious exer-
cise, and government had no business "compos[ing] official prayers for any
group of the American people to recite as part of a religious program carried on
by the government." 3" The Court struck down the prayers in Lee and Santa Fe
because they coerced students to participate in religious exercises.345
Under a nonpreferentialist standard, however, the underlying purpose and
coercive effect of student and teacher-led prayer do not matter. While prayer
undoubtedly is a religious exercise, the practice of reciting a prayer does not by
itself amount to the designation of a national church. Prayer typically is but
one aspect of a religion, and it is a practice common to many religions.346
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds") , quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
343 Gey, supra note 9, at 755; see also Werhan, supra note 8, at 607 (stating that govern-
ment-sponsored religious activity in public schools is tantamount to majoritarianism).
"I Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
341 See supra notes 118-19.
346 See Parrinder, supra note 331, at 19 (stating that prayer is "[t]he simplest form of
worship" and "can be a personal wish or invocation," offered "without ritual or priestly
intermediary," or a "formal and communal rite led by priests or laymen"); see also ATLAS OF
THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 40 (Ninian Smart & Frederick W. Denny eds., 2d ed. 2007) (stat-
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Moreover, a nondenominational prayer does not prefer one religious sect over
another. Thus, nondenominational prayers like those challenged in Engel, Lee,
and Santa Fe could withstand scrutiny under a nonpreferentialist standard.34 7
Indeed, Justice O'Connor predicted this result in her Wallace concurrence,
when she stated that Rehnquist's nonpreferentialist approach "would permit vo-
cal group prayer in public schools." '348
B. Release-Time for Religious Instruction
Release-time for religious instruction is another area in which a nonpreferen-
tialist standard could increase the role of religion in public schools. In McCol-
lum, the Court struck down a program through which students were released
during school hours to attend classes in religious instruction that were taught on
public school campuses.349 Teachers employed by private religious groups led
the classes, and classes were taught "in three separate religious groups by Prot-
estant teachers, Catholic priests, and a Jewish rabbi[.]"35 The Court held that
the program violated the Establishment Clause because it was "a utilization of
the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious
groups to spread their faith."35'
Such a program could survive scrutiny under a nonpreferentialist standard.
By offering classes in several faiths, such as Judaism, Catholicism, Islam, Hin-
duism, Buddhism, and Protestant faiths, a McCollum-type program would not
prefer one religion over another but favor all religions generally. Indeed, the
lawyers defending the program in McCollum argued that it was constitutional
because the Establishment Clause permits "impartial governmental assistance
of all religions. '"352 A McCollum-type program also would not constitute the
designation of a national church. While such a program offers instruction in
religious doctrines, it does not establish an official church sponsored by the
government. Thus, a release-time program could be designed that would pass
constitutional muster under a nonpreferentialist interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause.
ing that in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, "it came to be believed that God spoke to
humans and listened to prayers in a particular language").
"I See Gey, supra note 9, at 755 ("Under a nonpreferentialist regime, a simple nod to-
ward ecumenism would be sufficient to satisfy the Establishment Clause, even if the imple-
mentation of the government program would favor (at least in the broad outlines) the majori-
ty's form of religious exercise.").
348 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 79 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Gey, supra note 9, at
755 ("Adopting the nonpreferentialist approach to the Establishment Clause would entail
overruling all of the Court's school prayer decisions, as well as the other decisions in which
the Court prohibited the government from symbolically or verbally endorsing religion.").
349 See supra at p. 8.
310 McCollum v. 3d. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1948).
351 id. at 210.
352 Id. at 211.
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C. Bible Reading and Displaying the Ten Commandments
Reading the Bible and displaying the Ten Commandments in public schools
presents closer questions under a nonpreferentialist standard. In Schempp, the
Court struck down the practice of requiring students to recite verses from the
Bible because the purpose was to aid religion.35 3 Similarly, in Stone v. Graham
the Court held unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring a copy of the Ten
Commandments to be posted on the wall of every public classroom in the
State.354 The Court held that the statute violated the Establishment Clause be-
cause it had no secular purpose.3 55
Under the first element of the nonpreferentialist standard, however, the lack
of a secular purpose is irrelevant to whether a school-sponsored religious prac-
tice violates the Establishment Clause.3 56 Displaying the Ten Commandments
and reading from the Bible do not amount to the designation of a national
church. Thus, these practices would satisfy the first element of nonpreferential-
ism.
Whether these practices could satisfy the second element of nonpreferential-
ism is questionable. While the Court acknowledged in Stone that the Ten Com-
mandments "are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, 35 7
they are not common to all faiths. Neither is the Bible. Thus, a strong argu-
ment can be made that displaying the Ten Commandments in public schools or
having students read from the Bible would prefer one religious denomination
over another. 358 It appears that these practices would pass muster under a non-
preferentialist standard only if the Court were to adopt the broad form of the
doctrine advocated by Justice Scalia, which would allow government to prefer
Christian monotheism over other non-Christian faiths.
3 59
VII. CONCLUSION
In Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court established a neutrali-
ty principle as the touchstone for interpreting the Establishment Clause. 36" The
353 See supra at pp. 8-9.
354 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
355 Id. at 40-41.
356 See supra Section I.C.5.
357 Stone, 449 U.S. at 40-41.
358 See ATLAS OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 241, 247 (Ninian Smart & Frederick W. Den-
ny eds., 2d ed. 2007) (defining the Bible as "'[t]he sacred book of Christians" and the Ten
Commandments as a "set of religious and moral imperatives" listed in the Bible's Book of
Exodus); THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY DESK REFERENCE 293-96 (Paul Fargis ed. dir., 3d
ed 1998) (describing the holy books of religions other than Christianity, such as the Koran
(Islam), the Veda (Hinduism), and the Tao-te-ching (Taoism), and characterizing the Ten
Commandments as "the foundation of both Jewish and Christian morality").
319 See supra Section II.B (discussing Scalia's dissent in McCreary County).
360 See supra at p. 2.
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Court set forth the proposition that government may neither favor religion over
nonreligion, nor favor one religion over another. After Everson, a debate en-
sued among the Justices over the type of neutrality standard they should apply,
such as formal neutrality, substantive neutrality, or a standard accommodating
historical acknowledgments of religion. Despite these differences, a majority
of the Court accepted the premise that a neutrality requirement is inherent in
the strictures of the Establishment Clause.
That no longer appears to be the case, however. In recent years, the debate
has expanded beyond the proper neutrality standard to the more fundamental
question of whether the Establishment Clause even requires neutrality. In vary-
ing degrees, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy each have indicated that
they do not believe that neutrality is required in all circumstances. Though
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have not yet addressed this question on
the Supreme Court, their past writings and opinions indicate that they share this
view. At various times, these five Justices have expressed agreement with the
basic premise of nonpreferentialism, espoused by former Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, that the Establishment Clause permits government to favor religion over
nonreligion. These Justices appear poised to implement this doctrine if a case
allowing reconsideration of the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine arises,
such as a case involving teaching intelligent design in public schools.
The adoption of nonpreferentialism would effect sweeping and dramatic
changes in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It would reverse
sixty years of Establishment Clause precedent and permit the government to
endorse and promote religion over nonreligion. It would greatly increase the
role of religion in public schools. It would finally demolish Everson's wall of
separation once and for all.
Supporters of nonpreferentialism base their arguments on history, arguing
that this doctrine is the Establishment Clause interpretation that the Framers
intended. Regardless of the historical accuracy of their view, they overlook, or
perhaps even consciously disregard, the insidious side effect of nonpreferential-
ism-the divisiveness that it engenders. As Professor Laycock has explained,
[n]o aid is nonpreferential. Differences among Baptists, Quakers, Congre-
gationalists, and Anglicans made nonpreferential aid unworkable in the
eighteenth century. The vastly greater religious differences today make it
vastly more unworkable.
For the issues that are most controversial, nonpreferential aid is plainly
impossible. No prayer is neutral among all faiths, even if one makes the
mistake of excluding atheists and agnostics from consideration.... Gov-
ernment-sponsored religious symbols or ceremonies, whether in schools,
legislatures, courthouses, or parks, are inherently preferential. They near-
ly always support Christianity, and when implemented by their most ar-
dent supporters, they support a particular strain of evangelical Christiani-
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ty.361
In a country already polarized religiously and politically, the adoption of an
Establishment Clause standard that will generate even more divisiveness seems
at best imprudent and at worst reckless. Nonetheless, a majority of the Su-
preme Court appears prepared to turn in that direction.
361 Laycock, supra note 110, at 920. Similarly, Professor Gey points out that
[t]here is no such thing as a generic God whose preeminence all believers and nonbe-
lievers accept. Once members of the political majority are allowed to introduce some
version of God into government and some version of God's commandments into law, it
will become impossible to limit those sacred decrees and divine endorsements to benev-
olent and universally acceptable truisms.
Gey, supra note 9, at 797. See also Colby, supra note 200, at 1134 (because religious
diversity is greater today than in the eighteenth century, "governmental acknowledgment or
endorsement of religion is no longer possible without alienating and dismissing the views of
millions of Americans").
